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RELIEF FROM ABUSE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION*
HARRY GRAHAM BALTER"*
"Even tax administration does not as a matter of principle preclude
considerations of fairness."'
"A high-minded government renounced an advantage that was
thought to be ignoble and set up a new standard of equity and con-
science."
2
I
INTRODUCTORY
A. Clarifying the Terms.
The starting-point for the discussion of a topic as challenging, arrest-
ing, and perhaps controversial as the one assigned, of course must be
the clarification of terms, at least to the extent of what is meant by
"discretion," by "abuse," and by "relief."
In the first place, we must assume that the act or decision of the
administrative agency, here the Internal Revenue Service, acting through
the Commissioner and his agents or representatives, is based on the
exercise of discretion lawfully given him, and is not based upon a
usurpation of extra-legal powers
2
* Originally presented as a speech at the Marquette University Thirteenth An-
nual Institute on Taxation, on October 12, 1962. While the title could apply to
any administrative agency, it has specific reference to the Internal Revenue
Service of the Treasury Department.
SA.B., J.D., University of California (Berkeley), 1924, 1926.
' Per Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Angelus Milling Co. v. Com., 325 U.S. 293, 297
(1945).
2 Per Mr. Justice Cardozo in Geo. Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373,
379 (1933).
In Peairs, Jr., General Principles of Taxation: An Initial Survey (First In-
stallment), 6 TAx LAw REv. 272 (1951), the following interesting comment is
made:
"Whether because of the shifting and heterogeneous character of the police
power in its various manifestations, or because the taxing power is the sole
instance in normal, every-day affairs of government operating for govern-
ment's sake, taxation has been described as the perfect medium for the study
of governmental functioning in general and of the various factors which go
into the application of governmental power to the individual. It certainly af-
fords an excellent cross-section of legislative activity and of its ingredients; of
administrative agencies, functioning qua legislature, qua executive, and qua
judiciary, and organized as part of the executive departmental structure as
independent administrative commissions, or as exclusively judicial tribunals;
and of courts, engaged, in the process of statutory evaluation, interpretation,
and application in an elusive and kaleidoscopic factual background, and operat-
ing according to the various canons of judicial self-restraint or of legislative
obligation which may move them ......
3 In the context of the field of administrative law, "discretion" has been vari-
ously described: (a) "When we speak of administrative discretion, we mean
that a determination may be reached, in part at least, upon the basis of con-
siderations not entirely susceptible of proof or disproof. A statute confers dis-
cretion when it refers an official for the use of his power to beliefs, expecta-
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Secondly, what is an "abuse" of discretion lawfully exercised? In
a strict sense, the term "abuse" connotes the exercise of discretion based
upon arbitrary or capricious standards, or in an extreme situation, upon
a "dislike" for a particular taxpayer. As respects many laymen, how-
ever, abuse may simply be the result of the taxpayer's lack of adequate
knowledge of, or information about the justifiable legal basis for the
administrative decision, or a failure on his part to understand his rights
and obligations under the applicable statutes and administrative regula-
tions, all of which are undeniably legal and correct. In this same vein
we must distinguish between what is in actuality an "abuse" and the
more common situation of a taxpayer's dissatisfaction with an adverse
result which has been fairly reached by the administrative body.
Thirdly, what is meant by "relief ?" This term will be used in its
broadest sense: it is affording the taxpayer an adequate opportunity for
review and for continued negotiation from one echelon to another with-
in the administrative body itself ; it includes the right to resort to judicial
review; it is the enactment of legislaton to eliminate an area of irritation
and dissatisfaction between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service.4
And lastly, there is the real danger that an incisive discussion of
the subject of relief from administrative abuse will be lost in the milieu
of general dissatisfaction with a seemingly amorphous tax "system"
which exacts an increasing "exorbitant" dollar toll from its "victims,"
and which contains within itself the seeds of manifest inequities pre-
sumably directed only at the critics of the system, while at the same time
providing for "escape hatches" and "loop-holes" always for the benefit
of the "other fellow."
tions, or tendencies instead of facts, or to such terms as 'adequate', 'advisable',
'appropriate', 'beneficial', 'competent', 'convenient', 'detriment', 'expedient',
'equitable', 'fair', 'fit', 'necessary', 'practicable', 'proper', 'reasonable', 'reputable',
'safe', 'sufficient', 'wholesome' or their opposites. These lack the degree of cer-
tainty belonging even to such difficult concepts as fraud, discrimination or
monopoly. They involve the matter of degree or appeal to judgment. .. "(Freund, AINIsTRATIvE PoWERs OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 71, 1928).
(b) "It would be difficult to think of a word in administrative law more used
and misused than the word 'discretion'.... By discretion I mean that freedom
of choice from among a number of possible and reasonable choices available to
the agency in achieving a determination in a given case... " (Netterville, Judi-
cial Review: The 'Independent Judgment' Anomaly, 44 CAL. L. REv. 262, 285
(1956)).4 Many "relief" provisions incorporated in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code are
really elections or options given to a taxpayer, which presumably are bene-
ficial to him, if properly exercised and activated. In no sense do these provi-
sions constitute "relief" from an abuse of administrative discretion, unless it
be in the event of the Commissioner refusing to give his "consent" when re-
quired by the statute as a prerequisite to the validity of the option or election
afforded the taxpayer. This latter problem is discussed infra. (See Schwan-
beck, Elections and Options Available to Taxpayers in the 1954 Code, 32 TAXES
748 (1954)). There are other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which,
while undeniably in the category of "relief" measures, have no causal relation-
ship to the problem of abuse of administrative discretion, e.g., I.R.C., §172
(net operating loss adjustments) ; I.R.C., §1301 (spread-back of compensation
from an employment).
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B. Distinguishing "Abuse of Administrative Discretion" from
Other Adverse Internal Revenue Service-Taxpayer Relations.
Continuing our precautionary clarification of terms and delimiting
of areas of concern, it should be clear that an "abuse" of administrative
discretion, in its strict sense, must not be confused with a situation where
the administrative act or decision stems from any of the following
criteria, to name only a few:
1. Where the "abuse" is really not at the administrative level at
all, but is an "inequity" or unfavorable result to the particular taxpayer,
based on the Congressional intent, that is, on the provisions of the In-
ternal Revenue Code itself.
2. Where the administrative decision is based on a clearly lawful
exercise of discretion, from a legal point of view, but which is difficult
for the taxpayer-layman to square with his sense of fairness, as for
example, where the Commissioner's regulations provide that a new tax-
ing statute shall be retroactive rather than only prospective in operative
effect.5
3. Where the administrative act or decision is within the purview of
internal regulations, rulings, and directives, clearly within the confines of
the delegated authority specifically provided for in the statute itself.
4. Where at the first level of contact with the Internal Revenue
Service, the agent, or at a higher level of review, the "Group Supervisor"
or the "Conferee" takes a "hard" stand on an issue, since either a
"hard" or a "soft" stand clearly would be correct within the exercise of
sound discretion, or within the purview of a permissible agency policy.6
5. And where an agent or his reviewing superior refuses to "settle"
a controversy on an amicable basis which the taxpayer feels is eminently
"fair" even from the Commissioner's point of view, not because of any
personal caprice or adamancy on the part of the agency's representatives,
but because their authority to settle is limited by lawful administrative
directives, to "fact" situations only, which in the controversy in ques-
tion is not the basis of the proffered "settlement" offer.7
Within the strict definition of the term, each of these practices would
5 I.R.C., §7805(b) ; on the basis of the rationale of the Supreme Court in Hel-
vering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941), it is assumed that the Commissioner
has this power if exercised on a reasonable basis. 1 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, Sec. 3.25; Williams, Retroactivity in the Federal Tax
Field, 1960 So. CALIF. TAX INsT. 79. Another current example is the agi-
tation, principally in California, to ameliorate or invalidate by a specific act of
Congress the position of the Internal Revenue Service, seemingly correct and
proper in view of the present state of the law, to the effect that Congression-
ally-authorized compensatory "awards" made to Japanese citizens who were
"interned" during World War II are fully taxable to them as ordinary income.6 For example, it would have been much easier for a taxpayer to achieve a
"satisfactory" result in the area of deductible "travel and entertainment" ex-
penses several years ago than it is today.
7 Statement of Procedural Rules, General Procedural Rules, Sec. 601.105 (b) (4),
1955-2 C.B. 930.
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not constitute an "abuse"; however, in a broader sense, these can result
in a lack of "fair play" as they affect a particular taxpayer or group
of taxpayers, and therefore, abuses can and do result in these areas.
II
AREAS WHERE "ABUSE" OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IS
MOST LIKELY TO APPEAR
Having narrowed our problem by the process of defining terms and
excluding what does not properly relate to an "abuse" of a lawfully
exercisable discretion," we have not eliminated our problem entirely.
There no doubt are abuses in the exercise of the administrative dis-
cretion. It could hardly be otherwise where a gargantuan agency, con-
sisting of more than 50,000 representatives of varying degrees of quality
and of varying degrees of personal proclivities, are able to exercise
"discretion" at various levels of contact with the taxpayer.9
The principal areas where these abuses of discretion could occur,
it is suggested, are the following:
A. Determinations of Questions of "Fact."
Agents of the Internal Revenue Service must make many decisions
of fact in order to determine fairly the proper liability of a particular
taxpayer. Most "fact" questions involve not only an analysis and evalu-
ation of documentation, but an appraisal of the truthfulness of state-
ments made by the taxpayer and others. The "human element," i.e., the
agent's reaction to the "facts," therefore is clearly an ingredient in the
final conclusion, and in extreme situations, may result in an "abuse"
rather than the reasonable exercise of "good" judgment.
In this category could be listed, as a sampling, the following:
1. Whether a claimed expenditure was in fact made.
2. Whether an expenditure is "personal" or "business."
3. Valuation problems.
4. Useful life and salvage value in arriving at proper de-
preciation deductions.' °
5. Whether the taxpayer was a "dealer" or "investor" vis-a-
8 I.R.C., §7802, provides as follows:
"There shall be in the Department of the Treasury a Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
shall have such duties and powers as may be prescribed by the Secretary."
9 Circa 1962, the organization directly under the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue employed 57,000 persons who staff the National
office, 9 regions, 62 districts, 4 regional service centers and the National Com-
puter Center. There are 900 offices in all, ranking the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice in size along with the 100 United States largest corporations. (Caplin,
The Role of the Commissioner, 1962 So. CALiF. TAX INsT. 1).
10 Guidelines for Depreciation, Rev. Proc. 62-21, I.R.B. 1962-30, p. 6; Gall, Cur-
rent Developments in Depreciation, 1962 So. CALiF. TAX INsT. 703; Menden-
hall, New Depreciation Rate Guidelines, 40 TAXES 746 (1962); Patton, How
to Work With the New Depreciation GCidelines and Rules, 17 J. TAXATION
214 (1962).
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vis capital gains; that is, did he hold the property for sale to
customers in the "ordinary course of business," or did he hold
the property as an "investment.""
B. Situations Where the "Intent" of the Taxpayer is Crucial in
Determining the Tax Impact.
Generically close related to "fact" situations, and yet of a different
quality, are the areas where under the applicable tax laws and regula-
tions, a determination must be made as to the "intent" of the taxpayer,
in order to arrive at the proper tax impact. This kind of determination
often is subjective in nature, and there is therefore intrinsically, more
room for the exercise of "poor" judgment, to a degree which could
constitute an "abuse" of administrative discretion on the part of the
Commissioner's agents.
Here are some examples in this area:
1. Whether a corporation retained its surplus and earnings
to avoid paying a dividend to its stockholders, or contrariwise,
for "reasonable" business purposes.
2. Whether there was a valid "business purpose" or contrari-
wise, was the "motivation"' or "intent" primarily for tax avoid-
ance purposes in:
a) corporate liquidations, re-incorporations, reorganiza-
tions, and re-capitalization situations.
b) acquisition of "loss" corporations.
c) organization of "multiple" corporations. 2
3" While this problem is classified in the "fact" area, more correctly the problems
revolve around mixed questions of "fact" and "law". There is a plethora of
litigation in this area. For collection of recent cases, see 3B MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION, Sec. 22.138.
12 Representative references in these areas for further study are:
a) CoRPORATE LIQUIDATIoNs, ETc.: I.R.C., §306; 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INcOME TAXATION, Sec. 9.105; TAX IDEAS, 57009.3; Rev. Rul. 59-184, C.B.
1959-1, 65; Friedman, Divisive Corporate Reorganizations Under the 1954
Code, 10 TAX L. REv. 446 (1955); Grubb, Corporate Manipulations Under
Subchapter C: Reincorporation-Liquidation, 28 U. OF CINc. L. Rxv. 304(1959); Lyons, Some Problems in Corporate Separations Under the 1954
Code, 12 TAX L. REv. 15 (1956); MacLean, Problems of Re-Incorporation and
Related Principles of the Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAX L. REv. 407
(1957) ; Mintz, Corporate Separation, 36 TAXES 883 (1958) ; Ponder, Current
Status of Section 355 as Means of Getting Tax-Free Divisions of Corpora-
tions, 6 J. TAXATION 258 (1957); Rice, When Is a Liquidation Not a Liquida-
tion for Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 8 STANFORD L. REv. 208 (1956);
Shearer, Tax Problems in Corporate Reorganizations, 39 TAXES 1059 (1961);
Lesser, Business Purpose Revisited, 1962 So. CALIF. TAX INST., 513; McDon-
ald, Acquisitions Made to Evade or Avoid Income Tax, 1962 So. CALIF. TAX
INST., 435; Note: Reorganization Policies and Provisions: A Need for Clari-
fication and Change, 14 STANFORD L. REv. 848 (1962).
b) "Loss" CORPORATIONS: J. T. Slocomb Company, 38 T.C. No. 75 (1962);
Huyler's, 38 T.C. No. 77 (1962) (acquiring loss corporations).
c) "MULTIPLE" CORPORATIONS: Ekman, How Many Corporations Can Conduct
a Business, 19 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 391 (1961). Similar to the
problems arising from indiscriminate use of "multiple" corporations would be
the indiscriminate use of multiple trusts.
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3. Whether a corporate distribution of its earnings and profits
was as respects the particular stockholder "essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend."1 3
4. Whether the taxpayer paying over money to a closely-held
corporation intended to acquire an "equity" interest (stock) or a
"creditor" interest (loan) 14
5. Whether the taxpayer under-reported his income with
"intent" to defraud the revenue.' 5
C. Areas Where Impact on Taxpayer, Beneficial or Otherwise,
Depends on a Determination of or Consent by Commissioner as
Delegated by Statute.
There are many provisions in the Internal Revenue Code whose
operative effect by specific delegation of Congress, i.e., the legislative
branch of the Government, to the "Secretary or his delegate," i.e., the
executive branch of the Government, depends in whole or in part either
on: (a) a determination to be made by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (the Secretary's delegate) based on his "judgment" or "dis-
cretion," or (b) upon the "consent" of the Commissioner. To cite sev-
eral typical examples:
1. Determination by the Commissioner:
a) Addition to reserve for bad debts.16
b) Allocation of income and expenses between two or
more controlled entities.' 7
c) Whether a jeopardy assessment should be made.""
d) Whether a jeopardy assessment previously made should
be abated.' 9
13 Representative references in this area are:
Thomas Kerr, 38 T.C. No. 73 (1962); Aloysius J. McGinty, 38 T.C. No. 89
(1962); Note: Stock Redemptions in Close Corporations: A Plan for Taxa-
tion, 67 YALE L. J. 112 (1957).
14 Representative references for further study in this area are the following:
4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL. INCOME TAXATION, Sec. 26.10, et seq.; Benjamin,
"Thin" Corporations: Whose "Substance Over Form", 34 TuL~AN L. REv. 1
,(1959); Bittker, "Thin" Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAXES
830 (1956) ; Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Corporation, 17 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAXATION 771 (1959); Holzman, The Current Trend in Guaranty
Cases: An Impetus to Thin-Incorporation?, 11 TAX L. REv. 29, 44 (1955);
Manly, What to Do About the New Intent Test in Thin Incorporation: More
on Gooding, 5 3. TAXATION 379 (1956); Comment: The Thin Incorporation
Problem: The Courts Fighting the Tax Baby?, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 275 (1958) ;
Comment: Thin Capitalization and Tax Avoidance, 55 COL. L. REv. 1954 (1955).
15 Neither the civil 50% ad valorem penalty (I.R.C., §6653(b)) nor criminal
prosecution for evasion of the revenue laws (I.R.C., §7201) can be sustained
unless the underpayment was with "intent" to defraud the revenue. Obviously,
therefore, the state of mind of the taxpayer is the crucial "fact" which must
be determined by the investigating agents. For full treatment of this subject,
see BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EvASION (Third Edition, 1962).
16 See Calavo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 304 F (2d) 650 (9th Cir. 1962), involving
administrative discretion with respect to a proper reserve for bad debts.
'7 I.R.C., §482.
38 I.R.C., §6861; 9 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDmA INCOME TAXATION, Sec. 49.44.
19 I.R.C., §6862.
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e) Whether the taxpayer's books and records should be
ignored in computing taxable income for years under audit
as not "clearly reflecting income. '20
f) Whether to recommend ad valorem penalties for negli-
gence, delinquency in filing, or fraud; and as a corollary,
whether to recommend criminal prosecution for wilful vio-
lation of the revenue laws.21
2. Consent of Commissioner:
a) Change of method of accounting. 2
b) Change of period of accounting. 23
c) Change to LIFO inventory method.2 4
d) Change of bad debt deduction method.25
e) Change in depreciation methods. 26
In all of these areas and many more of similar nature, where the
impact is tremendously important to the taxpayer, the Commissioner's
affirmative action would be based on the exercise of his judgment, which
of course, in the first instance is that of the "man on the spot."
D. In the Exercise of the Delegated Authority to Implement the
Bare Outlines of the Enabling Statute With Activating Regula-
tions, and Other Internal Directives.
Congress has recognized that its revenue laws can be administered
by the Secretary of the Treasury and his agents only if the provisions
in the Internal Revenue Code, often in sparse or general terms, are
made specific and are implemented by his own rules and Regulations.2 7
20 I.R.C., .446, 6001; Regs. 1.6001-1, et seq.; 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXA.TON, Sec. 12.12; BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION (Third Edition,
1962), Sec. 10.4-10.21 Since "intent" to evade tax (civil) or "wilfulness" (criminal) is essentially
the same ingredient, the investigating agents, and especially the Special Agent
where a "joint" investigation takes place, make the initial determination whether
to recommend no penalties, the civil 50% fraud penalty without prosecution, or
the civil 50% fraud penalty together with prosecution for violation of the
revenue laws. Obviously, this area alone constitutes a fertile ground for poten-
tial abuse of administrative discretion, even though a series of administrative
reviews are provided for and even though statistics demonstrate that in ap-
proximately one-half of the cases where the investigating agents recommend
criminal action, this recommendation is set aside after review either in the
Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Justice. See BALTER, TAX
FRAUD AND EVASION (Third Edition, 1962), Sec. 3.1, et seq.
22 I.R.C., §446(e) : "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, a
taxpayer who changes the method of accounting on the basis of which he reg-
ularly computes his income in keeping his books shall, before computing his
taxable income under the new method, secure the consent of the Secretary or
his delegate." Also see: Wright Contracting Co., 36 T.C. No. 65 (1961) ; Comm.
v. The 0. Liquidating Corp., 292 F (2d) 225 (3rd Cir. 1961) ; Jones v. Comm.,
(5th Cir. 1962), 62-2 USTC 9629; Lord v. U.S., 296 F (2d) 333 (9th Cir.
1961); American Can Co., 37 T.C. No. 26 (1961) ;Burns, Accounting Methods,
1962 So. CALIF. TAX INST. 717.
23 I.R.C., §442.
24 I.R.C., §472.
25 I.R.C., §166; Regs. 1.166-1 (b).
26 I.R.C., §167; Regs. 1.167(e)-1.
27 I.R.C., §7801(a) : "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the admiu
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The legislative branch of the Government has in effect said to the
executive branch of the Government: "Here is the problem. Deal with
it., 28
In compliance with this edict, and certainly out of practical neces-
sity, the administrator of the revenue laws has unloosed a recurrent
cascade of Regulations, Rulings, Revenue Procedures, and other miscel-
laneous directives, most of which are published and available to the
public.
istration and enforcement of this title shall be performed by or under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury." I.R.C., §7805:
"(a) Authorization.-Except where such authority is expressly given by
this title to any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury De-
partment, the Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to
internal revenue.
(b) Retroactivity of regulations or rulings.-The Secretary or his delegate
may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to
the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect. . ."
Representative of provisions of the Internal Revenue Code where a specific
delegation of the rule-making power to the "Secretary or his delegate" is made,
are the following sections: I.R.C., §4(b) (optional tax) ; I.R.C., §72(c) (annu-
ities) ; I.R.C., §144(a) (election of standard deduction) ; I.R.C., §167(e) (de-
preciation); I.R.C., §168(b) (amortization of emergency facilities); I.R.C.,
§170 (a) (2) (charitable gifts) ; I.RC., §171(c) (amortizable bond premiums) ;
I.R.C., §173 (circulation expeiditures) ; I.R.C., §174 (research and experimental
expenditures); I.R.C., §247 (dividends paid-public utilities); I.R.C., §248
organizational expenditures) ; I.R.C., §263 (c) (capital expenditures: intangible
drilling and development costs) ; I.R.C., §266 (carrying charges) ; I.R.C., §302
(distribution in redemption of stock) ; I.R.C., §307 (basis of stock in distribu-
tion) ; I.R.C., §333 (elections in certain liquidations); I.RC., §362 (basis to
corporation on reorganization) ; I.R.C., §381 (carry-overs in corporate acquisi-
tions) ; I.R.C., §402-404 (employees' trusts, pensions, etc.) ; I.R.C., §441 (com-
putation of taxable year); I.R.C., §443 (returns for period of less than 12
months) ; I.R.C., §446 (methods of accounting) ; I.R.C., §452 (prepaid income);
I.R.C., §481 (adjustments required by changes in method of accounting);
I.R.C., §545 (undistributed personal holding company income); I.R.C., §556
(undistributed foreign personal holding company income) ; I.R.C., §565 (con-
sent dividends) ; I.R.C., §642 (estates-credits and deductions) ; I.R.C., §663(c)
(special rules applicable to executors of separate trusts, etc.) ; I.R.C. §743 (op-
tional adjustments to basis of partnership property); I.R.C., §755 (rules for
allocation of basis in partnership situations) ; I.R.C., §863 (income from within
and without the United States); I.R.C., §1033 (involuntary conversion);
I.R.C., §6011 (who shall file returns, etc.); I.R.C., §6014 (income tax returns
where tax not computed by taxpayer) ; I.R.C., §6046 (returns as to formation
or reorganization of foreign corporations) ; I.R.C., §6071 (time for filing re-
turns not otherwise stated in Code); I.R.C., §6081 (extensions to file returns)
I.R.C., §6091 (place to file returns) ; I.R.C., §6101 (period covered by returns)
I.R.C., §6103 (publicity of returns and list of taxpayers); I.R.C., §6161-6165
(extensions for payment of tax) ; I.R.C., §6302 (collection of taxes) ; I.R.C.,
§6325 (release of liens or partial discharge of property) ; I.R.C., §6402 (credits
and refunds as limited by Sec. 6405); I.R.C., §6411 (tentative carry-back ad-justments). In the following sections of the Internal Revenue Code, the rule-
making delegation includes the power to find facts or make other determina-
tions: I.R.C., §482 (allocation of income and deductions among taxpayers);
I.R.C., §545 (undistributed personal holding company income); I.R.C., §556
(undistributed foreign personal holding company income); I.R.C., §691(b)
(recipients of income in respect of decedents) ; I.R.C., §863 (allocation of in-
come within and without the United States).28 DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 46 (Sec. 17) (1951).
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No fair-minded student of the administrative process can quarrel
with the proposition that an administrative agency must have its own
rules and regulations if it is effectively to administer a given law. It is
also generally agreed that the agency must put flesh and blood into
what is usually a skeletonized statute. This must mean going into greater
detail and specificity.
There is also basic agreement that to some extent, consistent with
the declared legislative intent, the administrative agency must "inter-
pret" the governing statute.
The point of departure is generally centered on the question: to
what extent shall the administrative agency be permitted to "interpret"
the statutes, particularly where, as the Supreme Court has said in one
case: "There is presented a vexing situation-statutory language which
is inconclusive and legislative history which is irrelevant....
Some students of the subject insist that the interpretative process
must start and end with the Legislature; or conversely, that neither the
Executive (the administrative agency) nor the Judiciary (the courts)
have the right to "legislate by interpretation. ' 30
Others insist with equal sincerity that neither the Legislature nor
the Courts are equipped to fill the day-by-day needs for interpreting
what the tax laws mean; and that out of necessity that task must be
left in the first instance to the administrative agency with the remedy
available both in the Courts and in the Legislature if the interpretive
process by the Administrator gets "out of hand." In the view of these
knowledgeable students of the taxing process, although admittedly all
avenues are open to imperfections and inequities, "taxation by inter-
pretation" still is preferable to "taxation by legislation" or "taxation by
litigation.2
31
Be that as it may, there can be little doubt that the Commissioner,
with the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, through the process
of promulgating Regulations, interprets the laws as passed by Congress
"to the hilt," from the point of view of: (1) expanding the legislative
intent to the arguable outer-limits of taxability, (2) with an eye for
plugging-up "loop-holes" which would seem to be available to taxpayers
on the basis of the literal language of the statute, and (3) with an eye
toward effective administration.
To the extent that the "interpretation" of tax laws is left to the ad-
ministrator, who realistically is prosecutor, judge, and collector all in
29 Flora v. United States (2d case), 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
30 Chrommie, Taxation in the United States, 10 TAx L. REv. 411, et seq. (1954);
Pavenstedt, The Distortion of the Clifford Rule, 2 TAx L. REv. 7 (1946);
Miller, Gifts of Income and of Property: What the HORST Case Decides, 5
TAx L. REv. 1 (1949).
31 PAuL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 663-668 (1954); Eisenstein, Some
Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L. REv. 477 (1945).
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one, in most day-by-day situations, an over-zealous attitude well may
result in an "abuse" of the administrative "discretion" in a specific sit-
uation.
3 2
32Peairs, Jr., General Principles of Taxation: An Initial Survey (Second In-
stallment), 6 TAx L. REv. 481-486: "B. Administrative Attitudes
1. Regulatory Law.
There is a strong tendency for tax administrators to mold the tax laws to
the shape they desire, usually through the medium of formal or informal regut-
lation, under authority expressly granted or assumed, or even in the face of
inconsistent, statutory expressions. Regulations are meant to have the binding
weight of statute on taxpayers, but administrators resist being bound simi-
larly by their own regulations.
In studying the practices, as distinct from the powers, of tax administrators,
the first phenomenon to be examined is the tax regulation. The regulation
plays a very large part in shaping the law because it is less concerned with
balancing the pressures of different interest groups each of which seeks to
minimize its share of the tax burden.
Many regulations stem from express delegation of authority, under such
phrases as 'as the Bureau of Internal Revenue may prescribe,' or 'subject to
requirements to be prescribed by the Commissioner,' or 'with the consent and
approval of the Commissioner.' Others arise from the necessities of interpreta-
tion where the law is vague or phrased in broad terms, or where the fact situ-
ation involved is very complex. Many of these involve matters of trivial detail
not appropriate to statute; hence even in those states where the administrator
is not considered as having rule-making powers, such matters as the form for
tax returns and the instructions printed on the back are almost necessarily
administratively determined. Still other regulations (these are the least justi-
fiable) arise from cases where the administrator is dissatisfied with the pro-
visions of the statute or with the results derived from it, and is impatient of
delay in passage of desired amendments.
The tendency to volunteer interpretive regulations has been termed unfor-
tunate, because the administrator thus diverts attention from the real (legisla-
tive) law, and because this practice contravenes the common law philosophy
that such statutory gaps are to be judicially filled, each one in the light of an
actual, bilaterally contested case in point. The administrative pressure involved
in these regulations goes beyond a desire for a detailed code of the civil law
type, covering every point. It stems at least partly from a philosophy of tax
laws for the sake of taxation, as is seen when tax officials exert themselves
by lobbying, public campaigning and extra-legal pressure on assessors and tax-
payers to increase the total revenue of the state beyond what the existing law
calls for. This is manifestly a legislative rather than an administrative problem.
Another indication that administrative attitudes are not entirely the result
of a mere desire to have all questions covered by some regulation is seen in
the reluctance of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to be bound by rul-
ings issued from the Bureau except after the most careful scrutiny, so that
most of the numerous types of rulings issued are considered only advisory so
far as the Commissioner is concerned, however rigorously they may be enforced
against the taxpayer.
Numerous concrete criticisms have been directed at tax administration in
addition to these theoretical objections to regulatory law. Discounting these
for bias and the probable disgruntled-taxpayer origin of many of them, the
three most general, practical comments are that the tax administration is un-
necessarily slow, and that the regulations purporting to be for taxpayers'
guidance are unduly vague in many respects, while in others they are so de-
tailed and picayune as to suggest an origin in ingrown bureaucracy. The fact
that it is more convenient to specify the criticisms than to list the advantages
of regulations, is indicative of their many good features. They provide many
a point of clarity and convenience not to be found in the statute.
2. Regulations as Creatures of Policy.
Administrative tax regulations are the instrument used to reflect and give
effect to executive tax policy. They indicate that executive tax policy is pri-
marily concerned with full and uncompromising collection of all taxes due
under the law, and with plugging loopholes left in the law by the legislature.
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If a Regulation exceeds the taxable impact intended by the Legisla-
ture, it is hardly a solace to the taxpayer thereby aggrieved to be told
that he should seek judicial redress, which as we shall see, in the great
majority of situations is a weak reed on which to lean.33
They also show how certain non-tax attitudes of the executive tend to intrude
into tax administration.
A major manifestation of administrative attitudes in tax regulations is seen
in their reflection of executive policy. Examples follow:(A) Loophole-plugging. This is a perpetual policy concern of tax admin-
istration and lies behind many of the more flagrant instances of extra-statu-
tory administrative regulations, such as the Clifford Regulations. Loophole-
plugging also influences the quiet, everyday conduct of administration. Only
occasionally does the mole's trail come to public view, as when state and fed-
eral administrators agreed recently to facilitate their work by exchanging
information on tax offenders.
(B) The Pound of Flesh. Ungenerosity goes traditionally with being a tax
collector, and no personal criticism is due those who fall under the spell of
the mantle on taking office. The federal tax regulations are liberally scattered
with such examples as the insistence that deductions be taken in the proper
year or never, even though it may be difficult in a given case to guess what
year the Commissioner will deem the proper one. The Commissioner has not
been accused of squandering the public substance by undue leniency in apply-
ing the statute.
In Wagman, The Entity Concept in Federal Income Tax Returns for
Affiliated Corporations: Administrative Erosion of a Statutory Doctrine, 17
TAx L. Rxv. 576, 592 (1962), the author criticizes the Commissioner for hav-
ing, without justification, "legislated" in the area of the use of consolidated
returns by affiliated corporate groups through the means of Regulations and
Rulings:
"If the Treasury feels that the entity concept is not workable, or only par-
tially workable, it should recommend to Congress that appropriate legislation
be enacted and regulatory power granted. Absent such legislation, the entity
concept should be recognized for purposes of affiliated group taxation, and a
comprehensive revision of the Regulations should eliminate present ambiguities
with respect to actual realization, measurement, timing, and characterization
of investment profits in such groups. Rulings should then express, in terms
of these indicia, how the concept is being applied. If an exception is deemed
to be required, it should be separately provided for in the Regulations. If it is
not within the Treasury's regulatory powers, legislation should be requested."
33 Very few Regulations are set aside by the courts as being outside the bounds
of the statutory mandate, but occasionally it does happen:
1. The Clifford regulations [Regs. 111, §29.22(a)-21; Regs. 118, §39.22(a)-
21], presumably within the purview of the Clifford Rule in relation to short-
term trusts, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331 (1940), were considered sufficiently "out of bounds" to generate a
mild revolution of criticism eventually resulting in a statutory contraction(I.R.C., §671-675). Pavenstedt, The Distortion of the Clifford Rule, op. cit. fn.
30, supra; 4 CCH Std. Fed. Tax Rep., Par. 3703 (1962).
2. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Mitchell v. Commis-
sioner, - F. 2d-- , 62-1 USTC 9320, in reversing the Tax Court, held
invalid Regulations of the Commissioner under I.R.C., §1239, to the effect that
beneficiaries of a trust would be considered owners of stock for the purpose
of application of that statute. The court therefore held that the sale by a
taxpayer of depreciable property to a corporation in which the taxpayer, his
wife and minor children owned approximately 79% of the stock and where a
trust for the taxpayer's minor children held the remaining 21% of the stock,
was outside the scope of I.R.C., §1239, notwithstanding the provisions of the
Commissioner's Regulations which provided otherwise in this type of a situa-
tion.
3. The Tax Court in Edmund P. Coady, 33 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd. per
curiam 289 F. 2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961), held invalid that portion of Reg.
1.355-1 which had provided that the division of a single business into separate
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But in the vast majority of situations, the Regulations do not exceed
permissible statutory bounds, and for all practical purposes have the
same force as the Congressional law itself.34
While Rulings, Revenue Procedures, and other "internal" guides
and directives carry a lesser degree of legal persuasiveness than do
Regulations, this is true only in the event of litigation. In the day-by-day
contacts between the taxpayer and the agents of the Internal Revenue
Service, these "internal" edicts mold the "discretion" exercised by the
agents in the reaching of their conclusions as to the extent of the tax
impact to be imposed in a particular situation.D
segments did not meet the "5-year active business" standard in order to quali-
fy as a reorganization under I.R.C., §355.
34 I.R.C., §7805 (a) ; Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952); Commissioner
v. So. Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948); 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, Sec. 3.20, 321; MERTENS, CODE COMMENTARY, Sec. 7805.1:
"The Supreme Court has said that interpretative regulations of the Treasury
Department are entitled to great weight, and, as contemporary constructions,
are not to be overturned except for cogent reasons. Under numerous provi-
sions of the Code, the 'Secretary or his delegate' is directed to promulgate
regulations filling in gaps deliberately left in the statutory provision, and such
regulations receive even greater weight and ordinarily will not be set aside.
The Supreme Court has also declared often that regulations and administra-
tive interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to
statutory provisions which are re-enacted in the same or substantially una-
mended form, are deemed to have received Congressional approval and have
the effect of law. . . ." See Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. United States
(U.S. Ct. Cl. 1962), 62-2 USTC 9532, for an interesting illustration of the
Commissioner's broad power to change a long-standing basis for interpreting
what constitutes "gross income" to the taxpayer under the Internal Revenue
Code. In this case, by Mimeos 6779 and 51 in the year 1952, the Commissioner
revoked a policy extending back to 1923 whereby for the first time he would
include in the taxpayer's income not only the initial income tax paid by custo-
mers on behalf of the taxpayer, but the income tax on the income tax.
The question raised before the court was: "Was the change as to comput-
tation of income taxes reimbursed to the taxpayer, affected by Mimeos 6779
and 51 in 1952 by the Internal Revenue Service, a reasonable interpretation of
the definition of gross income under the law?"
The court answered this question in the affirmative and held that the change
in computation was not discriminatory: "It requires plaintiff to pay income
taxes to only the same extent required of any other corporation in order to
retain the same net income after taxes."
"Plaintiff argues that for almost 30 years under the former Bureau direc-
tive, the Government did not require pyramiding or the use of an algebraic
formula, but only required taxpayers to include the initial tax as taxable in-
come. Plaintiff concedes in its Reply Brief that 'while these actions may not
be conclusive on this court, they should be persuasive.' However, plaintiff also
argues that the long-continued acquiescence by Congress in the announced
directive of the Treasury Department from 1923 to 1952 affords such rule the
force and effect of law."
The court rejected this argument, stating: "Such a rule would require
Congress to change the basic statute each time there was a change in adminis-
trative construction, or to correct the interpretation."
The court concluded: "We conclude that the change in interpretation of the
taxing statute by Mimeos 6779 and 51 in 1952 by the Internal Revenue Service
was not unreasonable or beyond its discretion under the law." There were 2
dissenting opinions.
35 MERTENS, CODE COMMENTARY, Sec. 7805.1:
"In order to better enable taxpayers to understand the consequences of the
law which they are required to observe, and particularly with respect to pro-
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Finally, what must often appear to the taxpayer to be the last drop
in his cup of frustration is the exercise by the Commissioner of a tra-
ditionally, but arguably unfounded, "right" to refuse to follow, as a
basis for determination of the tax impact in his agent's dealings with
the taxpayer, the holdings of courts of law in relevant litigated situ-
ations, with which holdings or reasoning the Commissioner chooses not
to agree.
Periodically, the Commissioner publishes a list of court decisions
with which he does not "acquiesce." Short of the Supreme Court itself,
no court of law from the Courts of Appeals through the Court of
Claims, the United States District Courts and the Tax Court, can escape
the Commissioner's activated frown of disapproval.
Until the Commissioner decides to abandon his "non-acquiescence"
either because of a change of policy or because of the sheer weight of
adverse court decisions, the agents of the Internal Revenue Service will
continue to ignore those edicts of courts of law which are favorable to
the taxpayer.3 6 To this extent the Commissioner, for all practical pur-
visions as to which the impact on a contemplated transaction is in doubt, the
Internal Revenue Service has adopted the practice of issuing advisory rulings
and determination letters in response to requests submitted in writing. These
administrative pronouncements are of two kinds. One is known as a 'ruling'
and is issued by the national office in Washington, and the other, a 'determina-
tion letter', is issued by the District Directors. Determination letters are issued
only with respect to completed transactions, and only where the determination
involves the application of clearly established rules. Special provision is made
for the issuance of determination letters on the exempt status of an organiza-
tion and the qualification for exemption of an employees' trust or plan. Rulings
are available in areas which fall outside the scope of determination letters.
Neither will be issued generally, in connection with a transaction as to which
a return has already been filed and as to which the period of limitations has
not expired, or where the question is one primarily of fact. Rulings and de-
termination letters generally will be adhered to on audit of a return if there
has been no material change of fact or law from that posed by the application
for the ruling or letter. A request for a ruling or determination letter may be
withdrawn, but the papers are not returned to the taxpayer and information
concerning the request may be forwarded to and considered by the District
director in connection with the taxpayer's returns."
Also see: Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the IRS: A Statement of
Principles, 20 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 1 (1962); Sugarman, Federal
Tax Rulings Procedure, 10 TAX L. REv. 1 (1954). Eberhart, A Modern Ap-
proach to Making Federal Regulations Available, 22 FED. B. J. 32 (1962).
386 Recent examples of abandonment of "non-acquiescence" to court decisions are
the following:
1. Rev. Rul. 62-102, where the Internal Revenue Service concedes that it will
no longer contend that Sec. 101(b) of the Internal Revenue Code applies to
limit to $5,000 the exclusion from gross income of an amount paid to the
widow of a deceased employee, where the payment otherwise qualifies as a
gift excludable under Sec. 102(a) of the Code, "the Service has abandoned
its former contention in view of adverse decisions in the cases of . . . The
Government withdrew this argument in its defense of the case of ... The Ser-
vice will continue to argue that in extending Sec. 101 (b) of the Code to non-
contractual payments, Congress assumed that such payments did not qualify
as gifts, thereby endorsing the Service's ruling in I.T. 4027, C.B. 1950-2, 9,
that widows' payments generally are not gifts."
2. Rev. Rul. 62-127: "The Internal Revenue Service will follow the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Herbert Hum-
phreys v. Commissioner, 301 Fed. (2d) 33 (1962), reversing T.C. Memo. 1961-
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poses, stands above the courts and exercises his own judicial function.
In his defense, however, it can be argued that since the Commissioner
administers the tax laws on a national basis, only the decisions of a
national as opposed to a local or a regional tribunal, should bind him. 37
But this bit of philosophy of tax administration is of little comfort to
a particular taxpayer in Milwaukee who cannot rely on a favorable
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in whose juris-
diction he resides, and which is indeed a high level federal court, simply
because the "non-acquiescence" label has been placed on that decision
by the Commissioner. The taxpayer's only resort is to litigate. Obvi-
ously, under these circumstances, he may, from an economic standpoint,
be "pressured" into an unrealistic settlement which at least in his eyes
is the result of an "abuse" of administrative discretion.
III
RESTRAINTS "RELIEF" FROm ADMINISTRATIvE ABUSE
A. Statutory Provisions.
*Keeping in mind the distinction between the hurt to 'the taxpayer
9, with respect to the issue whether taxpayers are entitled to an amortizable
bond premium deduction under section 171 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 where the purchase of bonds did not have an investment purpose. The
decision in the Humphreys case is in accord with an earlier decision of the
Seventh Circuit in Maysteel Products, Inc. v. Commissioner, 287 Fed. (2d)
429 (1961), and cases in other Circuits. The issue involved will not be further
litigated.
It should be noted, however, that the decision not to further litigate in the
specific situation above described in no way affects the position of the Service
that a transaction, in general, will not be recognized for tax purposes if it is
a sham or otherwise lacks economic reality."
3. "U.S. Internal Revenue Service announced today that it will follow the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Com-
missioner v. William N. Fray, Jr., 283 F. 2d 869 (1960), and the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Laird Bell v. Harri-
son, 212 F. 2d 253 (1954).
These cases hold that a remainderman of a trust, the corpus of which con-
sists of corporate stock, who purchases the interest of a life beneficiary of the
trust, is entitled to recover his cost through amortization over the period of
the beneficiary's life expectancy, by ratable annual deductions.
The Service had argued that the purchased life interest became merged
with the remainder interest, with the result that the cost of the purchased life
interest could be recouped only at the time of the sale or other disposition of
the stock-
The Service noted that the transactions in these cases appeared to be bona
fide and without a tax avoidance motive. The Service's announcement means
that these cases will be followed in the disposition of other cases in which the
facts are substantially the same."
37Further tenable grounds for non-acquiescence other than doubt of the sound-
ness of any particular decision, would be: (1) quite often there is a conflict
between decisions of different courts on related problems, and until the con-
flict is resolved, either by the Supreme Court or by additional decisions whose
soundness satisfies the Commissioner, he reasonably may elect not to be bound
by a specific decision which may eventually prove to be unsound, and (2) the
very purpose of non-acquiescence may be to influence legislative change so as
to establish statutory justification for what the Internal Revenue Service has
already been doing through its "interpretative" process. Hauser, Litigation
Policy of the Chief Counsel in Civil Tax Cases, XIV TAX EXFCUTW 218
(1962).
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from an "abuse" of administrative discretion rather than that from the
terms of the taxing statute itself, as reasonably interpreted by the ad-
ministrative agency, we are able to follow the same dichotomy in specific
statutory "relief" measures.
There are some true "relief" provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code itself which clearly were passed to avoid entirely or to ameliorate
the administrative abuse potential.
Some of these provisions which come to mind are:
1. Restraints on Successive Audits.
I.R. C., §7605 (b), provides that:
No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination
or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books
of account shall be made for each taxable year unless the tax-
payer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary or his delegate,
after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an addi-
tional inspection is necessary.
The rationale underlying this safeguard against undue harrassment
has been aptly stated:
... These examinations may well be burdensome to the tax-
payer but by no other means can the tax laws be enforced. As
the years pass, however, the burden of examinations on the tax-
payer increases, the memories fade, records may be lost or mis-
laid, indeed to conserve space honest taxpayers may well destroy
their records relating to years as to which the statute of limita-
tions has run, and persons who have assisted taxpayers in pre-
paring their returns may die, move away, or for one reason or
another be no longer available. For instance, the taxpayer here
asserts that the legal counsel who prepared his returns for the
'closed' years has died and the accountant who assisted in their
preparation, is now over 80 years of age, and is suffering from
a defective memory.
We may well assume that considerations such as these had
weight with Congress when it legislated in Sec. 7605 (b) to curb
excessive administration zeal by protecting taxpayers from un-
necessary examination and investigation. 8
As to years which are still "open" to audit, that is, where the normal
3-year statute of limitations for assessment of deficiencies in tax has
not yet run, it is not difficult for the Commissioner to comply with the
statute. If they so desire, it is no problem for the investigating agents
to obtain a written notice informing the taxpayer that it has been found
necessary to make an additional examination. 9 In concluding that a
38 O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F. (2d) 365, 369 (1st Cir. 1958).
89 Even if the objection by the taxpayer is timely and a Commissioner's sum-
mons has already been issued to the taxpayer, the notice still may be requisi-
tioned, and a second summons may be issued which, if otherwise effective,
would be enforced. In Matter of Paramount Jewelry Co., 80 F. Supp. 375
(D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1948).
If no opposition to the summons is made on the ground of successive ex-
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written notice to the taxpayer was not necessary, a Circuit Court held
that the statement in the'deficiency notice to the effect that it was based
upon "information on file in this office" was not sufficient to indicate
that the Government had already adequately or completely examined the
aminations without the written notice having been obtained, the routine admin-
istrative processing on a deficiency assessment will proceed without obstruc-
tion. U.S. v. O'Connor, 237 F. (2d) 466 (2nd Cir. 1956); Leslie A. Sutor, 17
T.C. 64 (1952).
In two recent decisions, the problem of the remedies available to the tax-
payer who feels aggrieved by successive examinations which he alleges to be
in violation of I.R.C., §7605(b) are highlighted:
a) In re Leonardo 62-2 USTC 9614, (D.C. Cal. 1962), an application
was made to the United States District Court by the partners of the Avila
Meat Co., under the provisions of Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for an order directing the return of seized property and the sup-
pression of evidence allegedly obtained by Government revenue agents in
violation of I.R.C., §7605(b), as well as in violation of their constitutional
rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The partnership had been
audited for the years 1954 and 1955. Deficiencies had been determined for
these years and were paid. Sometime later a revenue agent, while investigating
a different company, noticed in its records, business transactions between
that company and Avila. Upon the basis of this knowledge, the agent became
interested in a re-examination of Avila for the years 1954 and 1955. This
agent, together with a Special Agent, returned to Avila, and on the repre-
sentation that they were interestd in auditing th years 1956 and 1957, they
were given the company's books which contained information for all the
years from 1954 through 1957. When Aliva's accountants discovered that
the audit being conducted was really for 1954 and 1955, a prompt objection
was made to this re-examination for the earlier years. In an interesting deci-
sion the District Court granted the relief asked for, not on the basis of relief
under Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for violation
of constitutional rights, but rather on the basis of a violation of Sec. 7605(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code. An order was entered suppressing the informa-
tion gained by the revenue agents with respect to the years 1954 and 1955,
whether it be in the form of testimony of the agents or in the form of their
notes and memoranda. Additionally, the United States Attorney was restrained
from presenting or using this evidence as a basis for prosecution.
b) In Reineman v. United States, - F. (2d)- (7th Cir. 1962), 62-1
USTC 9386, the facts were that the books and records of the taxpayer, who
was a horse breeder, had been inspected for the year 1954, and as a result of
this audit a deficiency of approximately $2,000.00 had been assessed and paid.
Later, in 1957 another revenue agent notified the taxpayer that he was assigned
to audit his 1955 books, but did not state that he would re-audit the 1954 books.
Nevertheless, the agent re-audited 1954 and determined an additional deficiency
in the amount of approximately $76,000. The taxpayer first became aware of
the re-audit for 1954 when he received a 10-day I.R.S. letter notifying him
of the additional deficiency. The taxpayer paid the tax, filed a claim for refund
and then sued in the United States District Court, alleging alternatively that
the assessment was improper as a matter of law, and that it was improper
procedurally since a second audit for 1954 had taken place without the notice
being sent to him as provided for in I.R.C., §7605(b). The Commissioner re-
sisted the second position on the ground that having failed to resist the sec-
ond examination, the taxpayer could not now complain. The Court of Appeals
affirmed a District Court ruling in favor of the taxpayer on this issue without
reaching the merits of the tax itself, saying, among other things:
"The question of the relief to be granted a taxpayer for violation of Sec.
7605(b) with a resulting deficiency assessment appears to be essentially one of
first impression. No case has been cited, and our research has revealed none,
where a deficiency assessment under this situation has been either upheld or
invalidated. Under the facts of this case, taxpayers are left without any rem-
edy to correct the illegal action taken by the Commissioner unless the deficien-
cy assessment is set aside. We hold that the District Court did not err in its
conclusion of law to this effect ... "
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taxpayer's books in a prior audit so as to bring Sec. 7605 (b) into play.4"
In other words, a cursory preliminary examination of the taxpayer's
books is not equivalent to an examination within the meaning of I.R.C.,
Sec. 7605 (b). 41
It has also been held that if in fact the first examination has never
been terminated, Government agents may continue their examination
without it being necessary to meet the statutory requirements for a writ-
ten notice to the taxpayer for making a re-examination. 42 However, if
the taxpayer is satisfied that he can show that a successive examination
for the same "open" year is unnecessary or unwarranted in spite of the
Commissioner's written notice to that effect, he may demand a hearing
in court where he may resist on that ground the agent's efforts to enforce
the summons. 43
Particularly as regards the examination of "closed" years, i.e., after
the normal 3-year period for assessment has run, the courts have re-
quired a showing by the Commissioner of the materiality and relevancy
of the requested re-examination of the taxpayer's books. This additional
burden placed upon the Commissioner derives not from the statute, but
is based in principle upon the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. For closed
years the taxpayer's books and records may not be inspected merely on
the basis of a "fishing expedition." Since only proof of fraud will sus-
tain an assessment for an otherwise "closed" year, the courts have re-
quired some showing on the fraud issue before enforcement of an ad-
ministrative summons against the taxpayer will be ordered. 44 While the
courts have not agreed either on the quantum or the quality of the
showing required, 45 no court seems to have demanded actual proof of
40 Tax Liability of Norda Essential Oil & Chemical Co., Inc., 253 F. (2d) 700
(2nd Cir. 1958).
41 National Plate & Window Glass Co., Inc. v. United States, 254 F. (2d) 92 (2nd
Cir. 1958).
42 Boren v. Tucker, 239 F. (2d) 767 (9th Cir. 1956).
43 For example, in U.S. Aluminum Siding Corp. v. Eshleman (DC ND Ill. 1958),
170 F. Supp. 12, the court held that merely sending a letter to the taxpayer
indicating the need for a second examination of an "open" year is not con-
clusive, but that if the Government wishes to enforce the summons, a court
hearing is required and the summons will be enforced only if on the basis of
evidence introduced, it is satisfied that there is a justification for re-examina-
tion.
44 Where no return was filed the effect, of course, would be the same as where
a fraudulent return was filed; but the typical case involves the issue of fraud.
On that basis, a successive examination would be approved. National Plate &
Window Glass Co., Inc. v. United States, op. cit. fn. 41, supra; In re Wood(DC SD Ky. 1954), 133 F. Supp. 297; Thelma Blevins, 14 TMC 840 (1955).
It should not be overlooked that where the agents are able to sustain the Com-
missioner's burden of proof, a 6-year statute of limitations would apply even
in the absence of fraud where an understatement of gross income of 25% or
more can be established. I.R.C., §6501(e) (1) (A).
45 Some courts, perhaps a majority, have required hardly more than a showing
of "good faith" suspicion on the part of the agent that fraud may exist in
the "closed" years. Other courts, perhaps a strong minority which may presage
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fraud, since it is recognized that the taxpayer's books and records in
themselves may be the only solid evidence to sustain the existence of
fraud.46 When contested, this issue becomes one for a court to deter-
mine after a full hearing.47
2. No Levy Pending Petition in Tax Court.
I.R.C., §6213 (a) provides that:
Within 90 days ... after the notice of deficiency... is mailed
... the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a re-
determination of the -deficiency. . . .Except as otherwise pro-
vided ...no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any tax
imposed ... and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection
shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been
mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day
... period ...nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax
Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final....
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 7421 (a), the making of
such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy dur-
ing the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a
proceeding in the proper court.
This provision has been held to be applicable even where the failure
to send the notice was due to the belief that the assessment was not that
an eventual majority position, require something more than the subjective ex-
pression of suspicion on the part of the agent. These courts require what has
been called variously "probable cause," "reasonable cause," and "reasonable
basis for suspicion." Matter of Carroll (DC SD N.Y. 1957), 149 F. Supp. 634.
The rationale for this view is that the examination of a taxpayer's books and
records is an administrative and not a judicial function, and that neither the
taxpayer nor the court should substitute their judgment as to whether there
is a good faith suspicion of fraud to open a "closed" year. O'Connor v. O'Con-
nell, op. cit. fn. 38, supra; Tucker v. Hubner (DC SD Cal. 1955), 129 F. Supp.
110.
In McDermott v. John Baumgarth Co., 286 F. (2d) 864 (7th Cir. 1961), the
District Court had ordered the administrative summons enforced against the
taxpayer as to the years 1951 and 1952 on a showing "that there are reason-
able grounds to suspect" that the taxpayer had filed "false and fraudulent"
returns for those 2 years. In affirming on this issue, the Court of Appeals said:
"As to the summons pertaining to the production of the corporation's
books and records for 1951-1952, we have set forth the nature and scope of
the investigation made by McDermott. We hold that a sufficient showing has
been made by the government to support the order of the district court, under
26 U.S.C.A. §7604(a), to enforce the summons issued by the Internal Revenue
Service, under the authority of 26 U.S.C.A. §7602. This is so, whether we
apply the rule announced by the Second Circuit in Foster v. United States, 265
F. 2d 183, (2nd Cir. 1959), and United States v. United Distillers Products
Corp., 156 F. 2d 872, (2nd Cir. 1946) that a §7602 examination is for the pur-
pose not only of ascertaining the correctness of any return but also for deter-
mining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax and that the
Commissioner is entitled to the examination, or the rule prevailing in the
Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, that the Service must show reasonable grounds
for suspicion of fraud, Falsone v. United States, . . .; Globe Construction Co.
v. Humphrey, .. .; Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., Paris, Ky., v. United
States .. ; Corbin Deposit Bank of Corbin, Ky., v. United States, ... ; Boren
v. Tucker,...
46 In re Andrews Tax Liability, 105 F. (2d) 583 (3rd Cir. 1939).
47 U.S. Aluminum Siding Corp. v. Eshleman, op. cit., fn. 43, supra; Arend v. De-
Masters (DC Ore. 1961), 61-2 USTC 9737.
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of a deficiency. 48 An injunction has also been granted where the statutory
notice was mailed to an improper address.
49
3'. Limitations on Sales Under Jeopardy Assessments
I.R.C., §6863(b) (3) provides that: ".... property seized for the
collection of tax" under a jeopardy assessment "shall not be sold" if a
timely petition is filed with the Tax Court.
If the Director of Internal Revenue has not complied with this pro-
vision, an injunction will be issued prohibiting him from making a sale
of seized property in contravention of the statutory mandate.50
4. Mitigation Statutes
I.R.C., §1311 to 1315, in certain limited situations allow correc-
tions of errors by either the Government or the taxpayer for years which
would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. This "mitiga-
tion" statute more often has been used effectively as a tool by the Gov-
ernment against taxpayers, but there are many situations in which the
taxpayer on his part has been able to obtain relief from an inconsistent
position by the Government through resort to this statutory remedy.
5. Limiting Areas of Friction.
Recognizing that certain perennial "fact" and "intent" situations by
their very nature tend to cause excessive friction between taxpayers and
the Internal Revenue Service, Congress at various times has attempted
to minimize these areas of friction and therefore potential areas for
administrative abuse, by establishing statutory formulae to create a de-
gree of certainty into what otherwise would be highly subjective areas.
Some examples are as follows:
a) I.R.C., §341-statutory "escape routes" in collapsible cor-
porations.
b) LR.C., §531-$100,000 exemption in determining "accumu-
lated earnings tax" impact.
c) I.R. C., § 1237-capital gain treatment afforded to "small" sub-
divisions.
d) I.R.C., §2035(b)-3-year conclusive presumption for gifts
made in contemplation of death.
4 Maxwell v. Campbell, 205 F. (2d) 461 (5th Cir. 1953).
49 Barack v. United States (DC ED Mo. 1956), 56-2 USTC 9961, 51 A.F.T.R.
1350. But an injunction was denied where the notice of deficiency was mailed
to the taxpayer at his "last known address" within the meaning of the appli-
cable statute, this being the address indicated on the tax returns which were
filed in the district where the address was located, even though later returns
filed in a different district showed the correct address. Luhring v. Glotzbach,
304 F. (2d) 556 (4th Cir. 1962).
50 Smith v. Finn, 261 F. (2d) 781 (8th Cir. 1958), mod. and rem'd. per curiam on
petition for rehearing 284 F. (2d) 523 (1959); I.R.C. §6863(b) (3) (B) pro-
vides, however, that property so seized may be sold if (1) the taxpayer con-
sents to the sale; (2) the Commissioner determines that the expenses of con-
servation and maintenance will clearly reduce the net profits, or (3) the prop-
erty is of a perishable nature.
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B. Extent of Review in the Courts
1. Judicial Review After Assessment (Proposed or Made)
Whether Payment Has Been Made or Not.
It may come as a surprise to learn from our Supreme Court itself
that there is no constitutional requirement that taxpayers be given a
judicial hearing in tax cases; the right to bring an action in the courts
to recover taxes may be abolished if a fair and adequate administrative
remedy directly against the Government is substituted.'
Regardless, Congress, no doubt in deference not only to the tradi-
tional public distrust of the "tax-gatherer," sui generis, but as well as
being unwilling to consider him as the exclusive repository for "appeals"
from "abuses" of his own discretionary actions, has provided for review
by the courts.
However, judicial review, it must be noted, as far as volume of
controversies is concerned, is a miniscule remedy for aggrieved tax-
payers. Only a tiny fraction of the disputes between the Commissioner
and the taxpayer ever reach the courts at all. The vast majority of con-
troversies are settled, by agreement, internally at the various levels of
review within the Internal Revenue Service itself.
Nevertheless, since the public image of "relief by litigation" prob-
ably is blown-up out of all proportion to the reality, it is important that
a thumb-nail sketch be given of the measure and scope of judicial review.
The bulk of tax litigation finds its way into the Tax Court of the
United States,52 probably because the proposed deficiency assessment
need not be paid before it is contested.5 3 Interestingly, the genesis of the
Tax Court can be traced to administrative review procedures within the
Internal Revenue Service itself.54
A much smaller volume of tax litigation is lodged in the United
States Districts Courts throughout the country, and in the United States
Court of Claims; the relative paucity of litigation in these courts prob-
ably stems from the fact that their jurisdiction is based on a rejected
claim for refund, preceded by the payment of the tax involved in the
proposed assessments.5 5
In a real sense, this ability to resort to the courts is an avenue for
"relief" from adverse administrative action, but not necessarily from
an "abuse" of administrative "discretion."
5' Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337 (1937).
52 For fiscal year ended June 30, 1961, there were 1,370 refund suits brought by
taxpayers in all the federal District Courts and in the Court of Claims (An-
nual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for fiscal year
ended June 30, 1961), as compared with 6,983 cases which were docketed in
the Tax Court for the comparable period (Annual Report of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of Treasury, I.R.S. Pub. No. 55).531I.R.C., §6213 (a).
549 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOM[E TAXATION, Sec. 50.02.
5528 U.S.C. 1346(a) (1); I.R.C., §7422(a); Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63
(1958), (second case), 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
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2. Judicial Review of Pre-Assessment and Collection Activities.
The quantum of judicial relief from administrative abuses which
may arise either from a situation where an assessment has been made
or proposed, or from a situation other than that clearly inhibited by
statute5 6 is extremely limited for the reasons we shall now explore:
Whether policy-wise, it is entirely justifiable, the Internal Revenue
Code itself bars injunctive interference by the courts "... for the pur-
pose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax ....
To a very limited extent, and much less than supposed by the public
or by tax practitioners, the Supreme Court has softened the Congres-
sional anti-interference edict, sufficiently to allow judicial interference
in "extraordinary" or "exceptional" circumstances.
On the basis of the rationale of its 1932 decision in Miller v. Stand-
ard Nut Margarine Co.,"' lower federal courts on occasion have found
"extraordinary" or "exceptional" circumstances in a variety of tax cases
justifying the granting of injunctive relief against abuses by the Com-
missioner in varying aspects of collection and enforcement procedures. 59
However, the 1962 Supreme Court decision in Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Navigation Co., Inc.6" has shed a cold and sobering light
dulling any undue enthusiasm on the part of those who had hoped that
court interference with collection procedures may become a really useful
tool in the curbing of administrative "abuses." The facts in the Enochs
case were these: Fearing that the District Director of Internal Revenue
for Mississippi would attempt to collect allegedly past due social secur-
ity and unemployment taxes for the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, Williams
Packing & Navigation Co. brought suit in the United States District
Court, maintaining that it was not liable for the exactions and seeking
an injunction prohibiting their collection. The court, relying upon the
Supreme Court decision in the Nut Margarine case, permanently en-
joined collection of the taxes on the ground that they were not in fact
payable, and because collection would destroy Williams' business. Wil-
liams was engaged in the business of providing trawlers to fishermen
who operated off the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts. It was the Gov-
ernment's position that these fishermen were the corporation's "em-
ployees" within the meaning of the statutes imposing social security and
unemployment taxes. Williams insisted that these fishermen were not
its "employees." Additionally, in its attempt to establish a basis for
56 See footnotes 38-50, supra.
5 I.R.C., §7421 (a).
58 284 U.S. 498.
59 Chief among them are those where it is found as a fact that irreparable dam-
ages would result if the taxpayer were delegated to the normal remedy of a
suit for refund. A list of exceptions to the "no injunction" rule can be found
in Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Maysey (DC SD N.Y. 1956), 141 F. Supp. 340;
United States v. Brodson, 234 F. (2d) 97 (7th Cir. 1956). Also see collection
of authorities in 9 MERTENS, LAW OF FDERAL INCOME TAXATION, Sec. 49.212.60 -U.S.--, 8 L. Ed. (2d) 292.
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equitable jurisdiction, Williams maintained that it would be "thrown into
bankruptcy" if required to pay the entire assessment of $41,568.57. The
Government resisted on the ground that Williams improperly denuded
itself of assets in anticipation of its tax liability, and that in any event
it could pay the assessment for a single quarter and then sue for a re-
fund, thus testing the validity of the assessment.
In reversing the decree of the District Court and ordering the com.
plaint dismissed, the Chief Justice, speaking without a dissent, said:
The object of §7421 (a) is to withdraw jurisdiction from the
state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions
prohibiting the collection of federal taxes. In Miller v. Standard
Nut Margarine Co. . . . this Court was confronted with the
question whether a manufacturer of "Southern Nut Product"
could enjoin the collection of federal oleomargarine taxes on its
goods. Prior to the assessment in issue three lower federal court
cases had held that similar produces were non-taxable and, by
letter, the collector had informed the manufacturer that "South-
ern Nut Product" was not subject to the tax. This Court found
that "a valid oleomargarine tax could by no legal possibility have
been assessed against ... [the manufacturer], and therefore the
reasons underlying . . . [§7421(a)] apply, if at all, with little
force." Noting that collection of the tax "would destroy its busi-
ness, 'ruin it financially and inflict serious loss for which it would
have no remedy at law," the Court held that an injunction could
properly issue. . . . The courts below seem to have found that
Nut Margarine decides that §7421(a) does not bar suit for an
injunction against the collection of taxes not due if the legal
remedy is inadequate. We cannot agree....
The manifest purpose of §7421(a) is to permit the United
States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without ju-
dicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to the dis-
puted sums be determined in a suit for refund. In this manner
the United States is assured of prompt collection of its lawful
revenue. Nevertheless, if it is clear that under "no circumstances
could the Government ultimately prevail, the central purpose of
the Act is inapplicable and, under the Nut Margarine case, the
attempted collection may be enjoined if equity jurisdiction other-
wise exists. In such a situation the exaction is merely in "the
guise of a tax....
We believe that the question of whether the Government has
a chance of ultimately prevailing is to be determined on the
basis of the information available to it at the time of suit. Only
if it is then apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law
and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim, may
the suit for an injunction be maintained. Otherwise, the District
Court is without jurisdiction, and the complaint must be dis-
missed. To require more than good faith on the part of the
Government would unduly interfere with a collateral objective
of the Act-protection of the collector from litigation pending a
suit for refund. And to permit even the maintenance of a suit
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in which an injunction could issue only after the taxpayer's non-
liability had been conclusively established might "in every prac-
tical sense operate to suspend collection of the... taxes until the
litigation is ended." . . . Thus, in general, the Act prohibits suits
for injunctions barring the collection of federal taxes "when [the
collecting] officers ... have made the assessment, and claim that
it is valid....
The record before us clearly reveals that the Government's
claim of liability was not without foundation....
Even in "peripheral" areas where the taxpayer, finding himself en-
meshed within the tentacles of the vast enforcement machinery of the
Internal Revenue Service, cries out in despair for "relief" in a situation
which should generate some degree of sympathy, the courts, at least at
the appellate level, have shied away.61
C. Administrative.
Despite the gargantuan powers which Congress has vested in the
administrative agency, it must be stated in fairness that "abuses" of
the Commissioner's "discretion," as these terms have been de-limited
by clarification and distillation, have been the rare exception rather than
the rule, in spite of the vast potential for distortion of the available
discretion.
If the published statements of the last two Commissioners of In-
ternal Revenue is any criterion of a trend, there is evidence of a con-
scientious and dedicated effort by the administrative agency to eliminate
"abuses" as much as it is possible to do so, considering all factors in-
volved.6
2
Indeed, as has been pointed out, the "self-assessment" system may
well break down if the taxpayer builds up an image of unfair treatment
by the Internal Revenue Service.6 3
61 a) The case of United States v. Brodson (DC ED Wisc. 1956), 136 F. Supp.
158, rev'd. on appeal, 241 F. (2d) 107 (7th Cir. 1957), brought to light the
difficulties a defendant in a tax evasion case faces when all of his funds are
tied up with jeopardy assessments, making it impossible for him to employ
competent accounting assistance in aid of his defense. The Section of Taxation
of the American Bar Association recommended corrective legislation, but to
date Congress has not seen fit to make any changes in the basic jeopardy
assessment statutes. See Report of Section of Taxation, American Bar Associ-
ation, Los Angeles Meeting (1958), p. 157, et seq.
b) In Campbell v. Gutersloh, 287 F. (2d) 878 (5th Cir. 1961), it was held
that it was improper for the District Court (DC Texas 1960, 184 F. Supp. 392),
to grant an injunction denying the Commissioner the right to determine pro-
posed deficiencies through the use of the bank deposit and expenditures
method of reconstructing income, merely because the method, relying as it
would on bank transactions covering many years, could deprive taxpayers of
any reasonable explanation and defense, this not being an allegation of the
"exceptional circumstances" which is a prerequisite for injunctive relief in
derogation of the anti-injunction statute.62Latham, Responsibilities of the Internal Revenue Service, 1960 So. CALIF. TAX
INST. 1; Caplin, The Role of the Commissioner, 1962 So. CALIF. TAX INST. 1.
63 Caplan, The Role of the Cominissioner, op. cit., fn. 62, supra, at p. 14: "Our sys-
tem is based on the good faith of the American people and their confidence
that the law is operating fairly and impartially, and that their neighbors are
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Towards the end of sustaining an image of "fair-dealing" there is
the impetus for self-analysis and self-improvement, which on the whole,
with the exception of atypical aberrations,6 4 has been a continuous
process.
Circa late 1962, the Internal Revenue Service itself has developed
substantial bulwarks which should minimize the occurrence of "abuses"
on more than a sporadic basis, among which the following should be
mentioned:
1. "Top" officials of the Service, that is, Assistant Commissioners
in the National Office, Regional Commissioners, and District Directors,
are selected in strict compliance with Civil Service principles of merit
promotion.6"
2. Recruiting and training programs for the more than 50,000 agents
of the Service have been stepped up and intensified.6
paying their proper share of the taxes. We must do everything possible to
strengthen this confidence...."
64 The 1951-1952 "tax scandals," centered mostly in the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue, shook the citizens' confidence in the integrity of the entire tax-collecting
system. See BXLTER, FRA~u UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAW (2nd ed.), p. 63, et seq.,
for a review of this unsavory epoch.
65 Caplin, The Role of the Commissioner, op. cit., fn. 62, supra, 1, 2:
"One of the main administrative duties is to select key officials for the Ser-
vice--such officials as the Deputy Commissioner, the six Assistant Commis-
sioners, Regional Commissioners and the District Directors. These top posi-
tions, like all others in the Service, are filled in strict comhpliance with the
Civil Service principle of merit promotion. The importance of the merit system
in staffing the Internal Revenue Service has been unequivocally endorsed by
the President and the Secretary of the Treasury and cannot be over-empha-
sized."
66 Caplin, The Role of the Commissioner, op. cit., fn. 62, supra, 1, 3:
"Other important administrative tasks include devising ways of upgrading
our space and equipment, stepping up recruiting and training programs, im-
proving enforcement techniques and administrative procedures, and maintain-
ing a proper balance in our salary structure including supergrade positions....
Of vital importance, too, is maintenance of the highest integrity in every phase
of our operations. Another essential program is designed to provide effective
evaluation of the performance of our employees. We are making progress in
this area by elevating the standards upon which employees are rated, and by
substituting more sophisticated, more subjective bases for evaluation closely
tied to case-and-dollar production statistics."
Latham, Responsibilities of the Internal Revenue Service, op. cit., fn. 62,
supra, 1, 8:
"To me, our first responsibility is to ensure employee competence. Without
it, none of our specific responsibilities can be discharged.
Competence covers both managerial and technical areas and includes the
ability to understand and embrace our basic policies. Our people must know
that advancement within the Service is based on overall performance and not
on quotas, either in dollars produced or cases disposed of. They must be
trained to evaluate facts on an objective basis. Innate courtesy must become
a part of the fabric of their lives.
All this requires as the first step an effective recruiting program. This we
have. Most of our technical people now are recruited through vigorous efforts
aimed at college seniors. They include careful and realistic evaluation and
selection methods. It is indeed a far cry from the days when employee re-
cruitment was based upon blanket invitations to apply appearing on Post
Office bulletin boards next to 'Wanted' posters, and when selections were
based on rigid written examinations which, of course, can test only a few of
the elements that should be measured by an effective selection process.
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3. There is a concentrated effort at all levels within the Service to
settle controversies, other than those of an inherent litigous nature, on
a fair and equitable basis.67
4. Towards this end, "settlement," "conference," and "review" pro-
cedures have been improved.68
5. Regulations in particular, and Rulings and Revenue Procedures
to a lesser degree, are drafted, promulgated, and made available in ac-
cessible publications, only after a painstaking and knowledgeable sifting
process through several echelons of review and re-evaluation, which
should increase the probability that they will be equitable and practical
in operative effect. 9
The next step in the discharge of our responsibility to achieve competence
is adequate training.... I will say only that no agency in or out of Govern-
ment does a better job in this field than does the Internal Revenue Service.
Our goals in this area are being constantly expanded."
67 "We also seek to reach settlements at the earliest stage possible. More than
98% of all tax controversies are settled at the Revenue Agent level. More
than one-half of cases going beyond the agent to informal conference are dis-
posed of there. Of the cases going on to Appellate, the bulk are agreed with-
out a petition to the Tax Court. Of the cases handled by Appellate in the
docket stage, approximately 18 out of 19 are settled without trial. In fiscal
1959 less than 900 cases were tried before the Tax Court." Commissioner
Latham, 1960 So. CALIF. TAX INST., p. 1, 12.
Also see I.R.S., Publication No. 55, Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to the Secretary of Treasury, as reported in 16 J. TAXATION
177 (March, 1962), which sets forth settlement statistics for fiscal year ended
June 30, 1961. Approximately 3.5 million returns were selected for audit. Of
this amount, only 15,724 reached the Appellate Division. The 6,983 cases which
were docketed in the Tax Court were disposed of as follows: agreed or stip-
ulated, 5,614; dismissed or defaulted, 330; tried on merits, 1,039.6 8 Rev. Proc. 60-18; Rev. Proc. 62-8; 9 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, Sec. 49.110.69 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, Regulations (1954-1960), p. VI:
"When issued, Regulations become known as Treasury Decisions to which
specific numbers are assigned. The promulgation of a Treasury Decision repre-
sents the end process of an elaborate administrative procedure.... The internal
effort which underlies the development both in tentative and final form of
Revenue Regulations is extremely interesting.
The initial draft of a proposed Treasury Decision originates either in the
Technical Planning Division of the Office of the Assistant Commissioner
(Technical) or in the Legislation and Regulations Division of the Office of
the Chief Counsel. As a matter of practice, both of these staffs work together
closely as respects all of the proposed Treasury Decisions. If one staff pro-
vides the initial draft, the other normally will provide the review .... These
two groups, working together, develop working drafts of Regulations in ques-
tion. After suitable working drafts have been prepared, they are reviewed at
various supervisory levels within the Internal Revenue Service. Thereafter a
draft of the Proposed Regulations is delivered to the Legal Advisory Staff of
the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury for tentative approval. Often, after
considerable and extended discussion, these Regulations are then published,
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, in the Federal Register as a
'Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.'
While the Administrative Procedure Act itself does not prescribe the form
of the notice of proposed rulemaking, it is the practice of the Treasury to
issue Tentative Regulations, in the general case at least, in form which is as
close as possible to that which the Department considers will be the final form.
For this reason, if no comments are received by the public within the 30-day
period allowable for 'protests,' the Regulations may well be finalized, i.e., prom-
ulgated as a Treasury Decision with an assigned number in the precise form
in which they were published as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
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6. Advice on how to improve administrative procedures is sought
on a continuing basis from business, from the organized bar, and from
the accounting profession, through "advisory" and "liaison" groups. 0
But in spite 6f all this, for the average taxpayer, the* reality still
persists that his image of the Service and its predilection vel non for
abusing its administrative discretion, will continue to depend on his
day-by-day dealings with the agent "on the ground floor.." As has been
succinctly stated by former Commissioner Latham:
-more often, however, comments -will be received concerning the contents of
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by the Treasury. These comments, which
may be submitted by any interested taxpayer, are assigned to Revenue Service
and Treasury officials who had been engaged in preparation of the Tentative
Regulations and are reviewed by them with extreme care. Time and place is
.,thereupon set aside by the Revenue Service for public hearing, in which the
written comments may be discussed orally with officials familiar with the
'Regulations in question. Thereafter, a period then follows, within the Treasury
* and Revenue Service, during which time the various taxpayer comments are
collected and assimilated and decisions are made within the Department as to
-which taxpayer suggestions will be accepted. In addition it is often a Treasury
:practice to question the field forces of the Revenue Service for their comments
concerning the usefulness of the Tentative Regulations. The comments of in-
terested professional groups, such as bar, accounting, and industry groups, are
also received. It is a general, although not a binding, practice for the Treasury,
when changes are made, to limit itself only to those changes which are more
favorable to the taxpayer than appear in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
If the changes desired will be more restrictive, the Tentative Regulations are
withdrawn and a new 'notice' is published.
After transition from proposed to final Regulations, which may represent
as little as a month, or as much as a year or more, from the time of original
publication as a notice, a Treasury Decision is ultimately promulgated. At
this point, field forces of the Revenue Service are expected to comply with
the various policies expressed in the Regulations. Taxpayers may also expect
that a position taken in the Regulations will be adhered to by the Treasury
except until such time as the position taken is changed or until the Regulations
are invalidated by the Supreme Court."
70 Caplin, The Role of the Comitnissioner, op. cit., fn. 62, supra, 1, 12:
"Another major responsibility of the Commissioner and the Service is to
maintain good working relationships and a high degree of cooperation with
business and the organized bar and accounting societies.
I have continued the Commissioner's Advisory Group initiated by my
predecessors and have been able to get valuable assistance from these out-
standing leaders in the tax field. This group consults with and advises the Ser-
vice on current problems and considers a broad range of future programs to
improve our tax administration. We are very pleased with the significant
contribution it is making to the development of stronger and better tax admin-
istration.
In addition, I am trying to keep in close touch with a number of interested
organizations-the American Bar Association, the American Institute of Cer-
tified Public Accountants, the National Society of Public Accountants, the
Tax Executives Institute and non-practitioner groups, as well. These contacts
include not only participation in their meetings, but cooperation with their
committees throughout the year in discussing common problems. In addition,
we have been inviting business groups to confer with Internal Revenue officials
in Washington or to submit written positions on technical issues in which they
have an interest. We do not want to operate in a vacuum, and we are anxious
to get a broad expression of views before reaching basic policy decisions. Our
current depreciation project, study of audit procedures for different industries,
and certain rulings with industry-wide impact have all been assisted by this
public cooperation and discussion." IRS News Release No. IR-533, Sept. 4,
1962, CCH Std. Fed. Tax Reporter 1962, Par. 6502.
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. . . the tax administrator must execute his responsibilities
through an organization of over 50,000 employees. This means
-not merely that he is responsible for the actions of people he
has never even seen-but that he cannot achieve his objective
unless he can somehow cause thousands of people in high and
low positions, in the myriad decisions they make in the course of
a year, to follow the policies, the procedures, and even the philos-
ophy theretofore prescribed .... Never to be forgotten is the ter-
rifying thought that if each employee makes but one mistake a
year, we will have a total of 50,000 mistakes, each one of which
inevitably reflects to some extent upon the Service as a whole.7 1
IV
SUGGESTED AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
With considerable temerity, the author ventures to record several
suggestions which it is hoped may afford additional "relief" from
"abuse" of administrative discretion. It is not claimed that all of these
suggestions are novel or ingenious. Some have been made before, but
were promptly interned. It is time for a reappraisal and re-evaluation.
A. Statutory and Judicial.
On the whole, independent judicial review outside of the Internal
Revenue Service not only reaches a very small segment of "aggrieved"
taxpayers, but additionally the entire judicial machinery is handicapped
by limitations, jurisdictional and otherwise, which sought to be re-
moved by legislative changes, for example:
1) The Tax Court.
On balance, the Tax Court has- played a vital role in affording tax-
payers, rich and poor, a ready forum for contesting proposed deficiency
assessments.
The feature of no pre-payment has been the chief magnet for Tax
Court dominance in the litigation field.
Yet the full capacity of the Tax Court as a forum for disposition
of litigous controversies is not attained because of jurisdictional limita-
tions. At present, only (1) years for which a deficiency in tax is pro-
posed by the Commissioner, and where either (2) income taxes, (3)
estate taxes or (4) gift taxes are involved, may be "redetermined" by
the Tax Court.
There is a vast and increasing area of controversies involving social
security and "withhold" tax and a myriad of miscellaneous excise taxes
which are not within the Tax Court purview. They should be. "On
paper," there are reasonably adequate internal administrative proce-
dures for review of these taxes, but the absence of a judicial review by
the Tax Court, for practical purposes, often lodges the judicial function
in the Appellate Division of the Regional Commissioner's office, where
71 Latham, Responsibilities of the Internal Revenue Service, op. cit., fn. 62, supra,
1, 7.
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it does not belong.7 2 Additionally, it is not a complete answer to say
that the District Courts and the Court of Claims are open as forums
where the proposed deficiencies may be contested. Putting aside the
problem of pre-paying the tax 7 3 these are not specialized tax courts.
There is advantage both to the Government and to the taxpayer to have
their controversies in these areas aired in a forum where the Judges are
knowledgeable about these types of taxes, which often are mystifying
to other Judges who hear tax cases only occasionally, and even then
rarely have to deal with taxes other than the familiar income, estate and
gift taxes.
Finally, jurisdiction of the Tax Court ought to be expanded so as
not to be hide-bound to the "no deficiency-no jurisdiction" rule. There
are so many situations where deficiencies are proposed for some years
and not for others, all years having been under the same audit; there
would seem to be no reason why the Tax Court should not hear and
adjudicate the entire "package."
2. The Refund Route.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in the two Flora cases7 ' have
diluted to a material extent the availability of the District Courts and of
the Court of Claims as forums for contesting allegedly improper assess-
ments in the dominant fields of income, estate, and gift taxes.7 5
Regardless of whether Flora is sound on the basis of statutory con-
struction and legislative history, it leaves much to be desired from the
point of view of the fair administration of the revenue system.76 Re-
quiring a taxpayer to prepay the whole "ball of wax" of proposed defi-
ciencies which may involve many tax years, including penalties, if any,
and probably including all accumulated interest,7 7 as a condition prece-
72Sec. 601.106 (a) (1), 26 C.F.R., Part 601; Fischgrund, Federal Excise Taxes,
1962 So. CALF. TAX INST., p. 889.
73 It is generally assumed that the Flora decisions (op. cit., fn. 55, supra) are
authority for the proposition that where the deficiency in tax is divisible, a
refund suit may be brought on the basis of a deficiency arising from a single
"completed transaction" for the full calendar year. In the area of excise and
other "miscellaneous" taxes, this would involve "pre-payment" of a relatively
minor sum. Steele v. United States, 280 F. (2d) 89 (8th Cir. 1960); Ruby v.
Mayer (DC N.J. 1961), 61-2 USTC 9604; Bellah v. Patterson (DC MD Ala.(1960), 61-1 USTC 9119; O'Neil v. United States (DC ED N.Y. 1959), 172 F.
Supp. 904; Jones v. Fox (DC MD 1958), 162 F. Supp. 449.
74 Flora v. United States, op. cit., fn. 55, supra.
75 As indicated in footnote 73, supra, the effect of Flora is relatively mild in the
area of excise and "miscellaneous" taxes.
76 For comments on the Flora decisions, see: Kaminsky, Mandatory Injunction:
A Promising Escape From Flora v. United States, 39 TAXES 699 (1961);
Lore, Supreme Court, in Second Flora Decision, Reveals Weakness in Rule
Established, 12 J. TAXATioN 371 (1960); Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax
Assessment Before Suing in the District Court?, 8 J. TAXATION 179 (1958).
1 Whether the payment of interest is a jurisdictional prerequisite is not clear.
On the one hand, the first Flora decision (op. cit., fn. 55, supra), may imply
that interest is not part of the deficiency in tax. On the other hand, I.R.C.,
Reg. 301.6201-1 provides as follows:
"The District Director is authorized and required to make all inquiries
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dent to availing himself of a forum where he is entitled to a jury trial,78
in many situations is an undue hardship.79 Congress can and should
ameliorate this situation.80
3. Burden of Proof and Presumptions.
One cannot quarrel with the basic proposition that where the tax-
payer seeks a "redetermination" of a proposed deficiency assessment,
or to recover taxes he has already paid, being the "plaintiff" he should
have the ultimate "burden of proof."8'
necessary to the determination and assessment of all taxes imposed by the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or any prior internal revenue law. . . . The
term 'taxes' includes interest, additional amounts, additions to the taxes and
assessable penalties." cf. Kell-Strom Tool Co., Inc. v. United States, -F.
Supp. - (DC Conn. 1962), 62-2 USTC 9541.
78 Of course, if the taxpayer chooses the Court of Claims as the forum for his
refund suit, he will not be entitled to a jury trial. 28 U.S.C. 2402. However,
the bulk of claims for refund litigation is in the District Courts, where a trial
by jury, of course, is available.
29 In the author's experience he has yet to find a taxpayer who has been willing,
even if in isolated cases he is able to do so, to prepay the total "tax bill" repre-
sented by the proposed deficiency, including penalties, even though he has been
counseled that his chances for "beating" the Government's case in whole or in
part are better in the District Court than in the Tax Court, principally because
of the availability of a jury trial. Apart from the financial burden, there seems
to be a psychological ingredient to the effect that if the taxes are paid in ad-
vance of contest, there is some sort of an admission that the taxes are actually
due.80 Since the Flora decisions (op. cit., fn. 55, supra) draw the conclusion from an
interpretation of pertinent statutes, any change in this respect would have to
be statutory rather than judicial. There has been recent agitation to correct
alleged abuses in not allowing taxpayers the speedy right to file a claim for
refund through the device of the District Director refusing to accept the tax-
payer's payment. This problem has been clearly set forth by C. W. Wellen of
the Houston, Texas Bar in a Proposed Amendment of the Internal Revenue
Code to Prescribe Definite Procedures for Assessing Tax, which will be pre-
sented to the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association:
"Fair administration of the tax law should permit a taxpayer faced with a
proposed deficiency to pay the deficiency and have it assessed immediately in
order to stop the running of interest, and he should be allowed to institute a
refund suit to settle such tax liability as soon as possible. Under present law,
funds delivered in payment of a proposed deficiency may be placed in a 'sus-
pense account' and not considered 'paid' until the Commissioner, in his uncon-
trolled discretion, decides to make an assessment. The object of the proposed
legislation outlined below is to correct this situation by requiring that amounts
delivered in payment of proposed deficiencies or in respect of a tax must be
assessed shortly after receipt." Also see Baird, Is IRS Justified in Refusing
Payment of Tax Liabilities?, 16 J. TAXATION 251 (1962).
81 It has been pointed out that the term "burden of proof" has two distinct mean-
ings in law: "One is the obligation of producing evidence at some stage of
the contest; the other the burden of convincing the tribunal where the evi-
dence is in even balance. Where the evidence is in even balance, and the tri-
bunal cannot say which should win, the party upon whom rests the burden of
proof will lose." Procedure and Practice Before the Tax Court of the United
States (CCH, 12th Ed. 1952), 119.
It has also been pointed out that "James Bradley Thayer in his treatise on
evidence demonstrated that the phrase 'burden of proof' was applied to two
distinct evidentiary burdens: the burden of producing sufficient evidence on an
issue of fact to entitle the party to have the issue decided by the trier of fact,
and the burden of persuading the trier of fact. In order to distinguish between
the two, the first burden is called the burden of producing evidence, or the
burden of going forward with evidence, while the second is often referred to,
although largely by legal writers rather than courts, as the burden of persua-
[Vol. 46
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
Nor is there much to be said against the application in tax cases as
in other litigation, of traditional "presumptions" and "inferences" such
as that corporate action is regular unless it is shown otherwise, 2 that
a deed absolute on its face is what it says,83 that the record owner of
stock is the actual owner,8 4 that a mailed letter was received, 5 etc. In
the main, these types of "presumptions" simply shift to the adversary
the temporary duty of "going forward" with contrary proof, and once
this temporary burden is met, the "presumption" disappears; it has no
effect on the ultimate burden of proof.
In litigated tax cases, whether in the Tax Court, in the District
Court, or in the Court of Claims, the taxpayer not only has the ultimate
burden of proof, which he should, but is handicapped by presumptions
against him, the fairness of which is open to some doubt:
First, there is the presumption that the Commissioner's proposed
determination of a deficiency in tax is prima facie correct.8 6 There is
considerable confusion as to what this presumption really means.8 7 But,
at the minimum, it means that unless the taxpayer is able by some
relevant and competent testimony to show that the Commissioner may
be wrong in his determination, the Commissioner can rely on this pre-
sumption of correctness alone to demonstrate that the taxpayer has not
sustained his burden of proof. Whether under these circumstances the
taxpayer would have lost anyway, because of his ultimate burden of
proof, regardless of the presumption of correctness, is debatable.88
sion. That these two distinct burdens necessarily result from the functions of
the judge and the trier of fact (even if the judge is also the trier of fact) in
our adversary system of litigation has been succinctly stated in the following
terms:
Where the burden of producing evidence, which one of the parties must
have at the outset, has been satisfied by the production of legally sufficient
evidence, this does not shift that burden to the other party. If the party whose
burden of producing evidence has been satisfied also has the burden of persua-
sion, the opponent may rest his case and still prevail if the trier of fact is not
persuaded by the evidence which has been produced. If, on the other hand, the
evidence produced is so strong as to require a finding for the party originally
having the burden of producing evidence, that burden is shifted to the oppo-
nent. The burden of persuasion, on the other hand, does not operate at all
during the production of evidence, but only comes into play when the evidence
is being weighed by the trier of fact ... " Ness, The Role of Statuctory Pre-
sumptions in Determining Federal Tax Liability, 12 TAx L. REv. 321, 329-332
(1957).82 John H. Parrott, 1 BTA 1 (1924).
83 Bernard Long, 1 BTA 792 (1925).
84 Fort Cumberland Hotel Co., 1 BTA 1256 (1925).
85 Lawrence v. Ham, 19 F. (2d) 643 (DC SD Maine 1927). cf. Ruth W. Oppen-
heimer, 16 T.C. 515, 527 (1951). (It is not presumed that the Collector's stamp
is the date on which the return was filed in the face of convincing evidence to
the contrary).
86 Rules of Practice, Tax Court, Rule 32, provides as follows: "The burden of
proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise provided by statute,
and except that in respect of any new matter pleaded in his answer, it shall
be upon the respondent."
87 See BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION (3rd ed. 1962), Sec. 10.4-5, et seq.
88 "In a tax litigation, regardless of forum, the taxpayer normally has the initial
burden of producing evidence by virtue of the presumption of correctness of
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Be that as it may, secondly, there is less justification for a plethora
of provisions in the Internal Revenue Code specifically aiding the Com-
missioner in potential litigous controversies with taxpayers, by creating
presumptions in favor of the Commissioner and against the taxpayer.
Here are a few of these statutory presumptions:
1. LR.C., §269(c) provides that in a situation of the acquisition of
a corporation "to evade or avoid income tax" the fact that the consid-
the Commissioner's determination. It is well established, however, that this
presumption is merely a formula for requiring the taxpayer to present legally
sufficient evidence negating the Commi~sioner's determination, which covers
each essential element of non-liability and is not itself capable of destructive
analysis.
When legally sufficient evidence has been introduced contrary to the Com-
missioner's determination and both sides have rested their cases, the issue must
then be decided by the trier on the basis of the evidence, without regard to the
presumption of correctness. But it is at this point that the further burden of
persuasion comes into play. It is the taxpayer again who has this burden which
entails the production of a preponderance of the evidence." Ness, The Role of
Statutory Presumptions in Determining Federal Tax Liability, op. cit., fn. 81,
supra. Baiter, Rules of Evidence Applicable in Proceedings Before the Tax
Court of the United States: Burden of Proof and Presumptions, 6 MARQ.
UNIV. INST. ON TAX. 1 (1956).
The courts seem to draw no sharp line between presumption of correctness
and burden of proof. For example, in Welch v. Conmissioner, 297 F. (2d) 309
(4th Cir. 1961), where the Commissioner had assessed both deficiencies and
fraud penalties for the years 1950 through 1956, and where the deficiencies had
been determined by use of the net worth increase method except for the year
1952, for which year the Commissioner intended to use the specific item
method because if he used the net worth method no deficiency would have
been shown for that year, the Tax Court had found for the Commissioner on
all years. The Court of Appeals reversed as to the year 1952, holding that the
Tax Court had no right to base its decision for that year on the presumption
of correctness of the Commissioner's findings since such presumption should
fade in view of the inconsistency between the net worth statement which he
used for all other years and the specific adjustments which he used for the
year 1952, particularly as to the cost basis of real property sold in that year,
saying:
"The taxpayer, however, did make the point at the trial that the deficiency
determination for 1952 was clearly at variance with the figures used by the
Commissioner in establishing the net worth determination for other years in
the consolidated cases and renewed the contention after the opinion of the Tax
Court was published, in a motion for reconsideration which the Tax Court
denied .... The net worth computations used by the Commissioner with re-
spect to the net worth years showed beyond question that the taxpayer was
entitled to deductions for the cost basis of property sold and the operating
expenses incurred in the year 1952 and that the Commissioner's rejection of
these deductions in toto was plainly wrong. In short, the presumption of cor-
rectness to which the determination of the Commissioner is ordinarily entitled
was destroyed by its own inherent defect. Under these circumstances the bur-
den of proof did not rest upon the taxpayer, and the Tax Court was not justi-
fied in basing its decision upon the failure of the taxpayer to show the precise
amount of the deductions to which he was entitled."
It would seem more precise not to confuse the absence of the presumption
of correctness with the shifting of the burden of proof. For further study of
the complicated and often confusing area of burden of proof, presumption,
and duty of going forward with evidence, see: 9 MERTENS, LAW oF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, Sec. 50.61, et seq.; 2 CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE, Sec.
7.3-7, 8, 8.6; Procedure and Practice Before the Tax Court of the United
States (CCH, 15th Ed. 1955), 141, et seq.; Orkin, Duty of Going Forward in
Civil Tax Fraud Cases, 42 A.B.A.J. 947 (Digest of Tax Articles, Dec. 1956, p.
61).
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eration paid upon the acquisition is "substantially disproportionate"
shall be prima facie evidence of the principal purpose of evasion or
avoidance of federal income tax.
2. I.R.C., §341(c), covering the taxability as ordinary income of
the gain of shareholders of a "collapsible" corporation, provides a pre-
sumption that a corporation is a collapsible corporation by stating that
if the fair market value of the corporation's "Sec. 341 assets" constitutes
50% or more of the fair market value of total assets and is 120% or
more of the adjusted basis of such "Sec. 341 assets," the "corporation
shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to be a collapsible cor-
poration."
3. I.R.C., §533(a), providing for a surtax on accumulations of
corporate earnings and profits beyond the reasonable needs of the busi-
ness, and stating that such accumulations are within the prohibited pur-
poses "unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall
prove to the contrary." 89
4. LR.C., §672(e), relating to the area of taxability of the grantor
of an inter vivos trust on the basis of continued substantial ownership
of the trust income, the taxable nature of certain trust powers depend-
ing on whether a related or subordinate party who possesses such pow-
ers, is "subservient" to the grantor, and providing that such subserviency
shall be "presumed-unless such party is shown not to be subservient
by preponderance of the evidence."
5. I.R.C., §2035(b) raises the presumption of contemplation of
death by providing that a transfer made within three years of the date
of death "shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been
made in contemplation of death.. .. "'0
Finally, it should be pointed out that in a very narrow orbit of con-
troversies, the "burden of proof" by statute is lodged with the Com-
missioner rather than with the taxpayer, namely: (1) where fraud is
an issue,9' (2) where the Commissioner attempts to remove the bar of
the normal statute of limitations for additional assessments, 92 (3) where
89 However, I.R.C., §534 conditionally imposes on the Commissioner in a Tax
Court proceeding the burden of proof as to an allegation that accumulations
are unreasonable in order to give rise to the statutory presumption. The con-
ditions for the imposition of such burden on the Commissioner are, alterna-
tively, the failure of the Commissioner to give the taxpayer a special notice
that a proposed deficiency includes an amount with respect to the accumulated
earnings surtax or, if such notice is given, the filing by the taxpayer of a
statement of the grounds on which he relies to establish the reasonableness of
the accumulation.
90 This provision is not too unlike that found in the Revenue Act of 1950 [Sec.
501(a)] which contained a provision that no transfer made before this 3-year
period should be treated as having been made in contemplation of death.
91 I.R.C., §7454.92 This would be true whether the normal 3-year statute of limitations applied,
the 6-year statute of limitations applied because of an alleged understatement
of 25% or more of gross income, or whether the Commissioner claims that the
normal 3-year statute of limitations does not apply because of a valid exten-
1962]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the Commissioner attempts to attach liability to someone other than the
original taxpayer as a transferee, 93 and (4) where the Commissioner,
in his answer to the taxpayer's petition in the Tax Court, asks that the
proposed deficiency be determined in excess of that set out in the notice
of deficiency. 94 While specifically the rules apply only in Tax Court
proceedings, by judicial transposition they have in the main been adopted
as well in District Court and Court of Claims controversies. 5 There
ought to be specific clarifying legislation to this effect for the sake of
uniformity in all courts.
In conclusion, a re-evaluation is in order of the entire perplexing
and often obfuscatory area of "burden of proof" and "presumption of
correctness" so that by statute a fairer balance may be achieved between
the litigous positions of the Commissioner and the "aggrieved" tax-
payer. As it now stands, the advantages are clearly with the Commis-
sioner.96
4. The Problem of Injunctive Relief.
The rationale of the extremely severe statutory prohibition against
judicial interference with the assessment and collection processes, other
than the pre-assessment resort to the Tax Court, must be that (a) there
sion signed by the taxpayer. I.R.C., §6501(e) (1) (A) ; C. A. Reis, 1 T.C. 9, 12(1942), aff'd. 142 F. (2d) 900 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Jacobs v. United States (Ct.
Cl. 1954), 126 F. Supp. 154; Washington Farms, Inc. v. United States (DC Ga.
1953), 116 F. Supp. 142; Louis Seltzer, 21 T.C. 398 (1953); John Lima, 11
T.C.M. 114 (1952); Marvin Berry, 11 T.C.M. 301 (1952).
In David Courtney, 28 T.C. 658 (1957), the Tax Court held in a net worth
case that the Commissioner has the burden of proving that unreported income
minus all proper deductions taken by the taxpayer equates a 25% omission
from gross income.
93 I.R.C., §6902(a).
9 Rules of Practice, Tax Court, Rule 32; Joseph A. Petnel, 12 T.C.M. 595 (1953)
Peter Goralski, 11 T.C.M. 543 (1952); Estate of John Joseph Nweeya, 10
T.C.M. 630 (1951) ; Charles 0. Mensik, 37 T.C. No. 71 (1962) ; John W. Snow,
Jr., 12 T.C.M. 1281 (1953).
95 (a) District Courts: See discussion in 3 CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTIcE, Sec.
11.44, at p. 240, et seq. The Courts of Appeals in seven circuits, as well as the
Court of Claims hold that the burden of proof is on the Government on the
issue of fraud in a refund suit. Representative cases are: United States v.
Thompson, 279 F. (2d) 165 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Paddock v. United States, 280
F. (2d) 563 (2nd Circ. 1960) ; Carter v. Campbell, 264 F. (2d) 930 (5th Circ.
1959) ; Ohlinger v. United States, 219 F. (2d) 310 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Reeves v.
United States (DC Neb. 1959), 168 F. Supp. 720; Bukowski v. United States(DC SD Texas 1955), 136 F. Supp. 91; Koch v. United States (DC ND Ia.
1955), 55-2 USTC 9559. The Government has now abandoned further litigation
to stem this tide. (Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States
for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1961, p. 308). CASEY, in 3 FEDERAL TAX
PRAcTIcE, Sec. 11.44, feels that some clarification is needed to resolve the con-
flict in the cases as to the Commissioner's burden of proof on the issue of
fraud in a refund suit. It would seem, however, that the majority rule plac-ing the burden on the Commissioner is so overwhelming that as a practical
matter the Government would be compelled to acquiesce to this rule in prac-
tically every jurisdiction.
b) Court of Claims: Johnson Motor Co. v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1934),
6 F. Supp. 122; Fidelity Investment Assn. v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1933), 5 F.
Supp. 19.96 Ness, The Role of Statutory Presumptions in Determining Federal Tax Lia-
bility, op. cit., fn. 81, supra.
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are adequate internal remedies within the Internal Revenue Service itself
to remove "abuses" and "inequities," and (b) that the ability to resort to
the Tax Court is adequate relief.
The Supreme Court itself, however, has recognized the inadequacy
of this rationale by indicating that there are some situations, albeit of a
rara avis variety, where injunctive relief by judicial interference is not
only justified, but indispensable. Even if it assumed that its decision
in Enochs v. Williams Paczking & Navigation Co., Incw is its last word,
there remain many areas of potential "abuses" of the administrative
"discretion" where any remedy short of injunctive relief clearly is in-
adequate and inequitable. Particularly in the field of jeopardy assess-
ments, and post-assessment procedures such as liens, distraints, and
collection activities, abuses are likely to occur.98
The harshness of the statutory anti-injunction edict should be ameli-
orated. There is little likelihood that the courts, given greater power to
interfere on what must be only rare occasions, would abuse this power
to the extent of weakening the normal assessment and collection pro-
cedures of the administrative agency.
5. A Court of Tax Appeals?
Review is available from decisions of the Tax Court, the District
Courts,99 and the Court of Claims. 00
Considerable controversy has arisen over the seemingly firm position
of the Tax Court that it is not bound as a precedent by an adverse ruling
of the Court of Appeals for the circuit from which a review of its
decision took place, beyond the purview of that particular case. 101
97 Op. cit., fn. 60, supra.98 Plum, Jr., Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAX L. REv. 247
(1958), (Second Installment), 13 TAx L. REv. 459 (1958); Kaminsky, Admin-
istrative Law and Judicial Review of Jeopardy Assessments Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 14 TAX L. REv. 545 (1959); 9 MER TNs, LAw oF FFaDERAL IN-
Co E TAXATION, Sec. 49212.99 Appeals from the Tax Court and from the various District Courts would lie
in the Courts of Appeals for the appropriate Circuits.
'
0oAn appeal from the Court of Claims by-passes the Courts of Appeals and
goes directly to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C., Sec. 1255.101 In Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713 (1957), the Tax Court justified at length
its refusal to follow a contrary rule laid down by the Court of Appeals in the
instant Circuit which had jurisdiction to review its decisions arising in that
circuit. In the earlier case of William E. Edmonds, 16 T.C. 110, 117 (1951),
the Court had this to say:
"... . the question we face here is whether we will stand by our decision
in the Strauss case and respectfully decline to follow the Second Circuit's
decision, or whether we will accept it as laying down the correct law and fol-
low it in the instant case. It, of course, goes without saying that the reversal
by the Second Circuit of our decision in the Strauss case makes the law for
that case. Inasmuch, however, as the Tax Court must endeavor to make its
decision uniform for all taxpayers within the United States, we cannot dis-
charge that duty by following a circuit court's decision in a subsequent case
by a different taxpayer if we think it is wrong, even though it would go to
the same circuit in which we were reversed, and even though the facts are
the same as the case in which we were reversed. If we did so, it would only
result in confusion and unequal treatment of taxpayers merely because they
live in different circuits. Therefore, when, as here, we have been reversed we
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This "heresy in the hierarchy"'10 2 has revived interest in the pre-
viously raised but largely ignored suggestion that Congress create one
over-all Appellate Court for review in all tax cases, presumably to be
called the Court of Tax Appeals, which would replace the Courts of
Appeals for the ten judicial circuits, as the repository for appeals from
the Tax Court and the District Courts. 0 3
There are logical pros and cons to this suggestion."'
It is time that this suggestion be re-evaluated from the point of view
of whether such a Court of Tax Appeals would afford the tax-paying
public: (a) easier and quicker access for review, and (b) a more ef-
fective basis for projecting the potential tax impact on proposed per-
sonal and business transactions and activities.
In conclusion, as to the process of judicial review, what we are
suggesting is that access to the courts for review of taxpayer grievances
should not be stifled either by (a) a dogmatic, and sometimes exagger-
ated, confidence in the intrinsic "fairness" of decisions and actions of
the administrative agency,10 5 or (b) the seemingly inherent "distaste"
by the judiciary to pass on tax controversies no more often than abso-
lutely necessary to settle problems of major concern. 00
The courts have an important role to play, not only in assuring the
specific taxpayer his "day in court" when he is not satisfied with in-
must examine carefully the reversal to see whether or not we will follow the
court in its reversal, not only in cases which lie within the jurisdiction of
that particular circuit, but all other circuits as well. This we have done in the
instant case. We have carefully read and considered the majority opinion of
the Second Circuit in the Strauss case and have decided to follow it...."
This position of the Tax Court has been criticized by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit [Sullivan v. Commissioner, 41 F. (2d) 46 (7th Cir.
1957)], and by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit [Stacey Mfg. Co.
v. Commissioner, 237 F. (2d) 605 (6th Cir. 1956)]; followed in Wexler v.
Commissioner, 241 F. (2d) 304 (6th Cir. 1957). See Tax Note: The Finality
of the Court of Appeals Decisions in the Tax Court, 43 A.B.A.J. 945 (1957) ;
Comment: Heresy in the Hierarchy: The Tax Court Rejection of Courts of
Appeals, 57 COL. L. REy. 717 (1957) ; Comment: The Tax Court, the Court of
Appeals and Pyra-miding Judicial Review, 9 STAN. L. REV. 827 (1957).
102 Comment: Heresy in the Hierarchy: The Tax Court Rejection of Courts of
Appeals, op. cit., fn. 101, supra.
o103 Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1153 (1944).
104 Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, op. cit., fn. 103, supra, co-
gently presents the arguments in favor of a Court of Tax Appeals. Also see
Pope, A Court of Tax Appeals: A Call for a Re-Examination, 39 A.B.A.J.
275 (1953); Dwan, Administrative Review of Judicial Decisions: Treasury
Practice, 46 COL. L. REv. 581 (1946) ; Proc. of the Eighth Tax Clinic of Amer-
ican Bar Association Connittee on Federal Taxation, 17 TAXES 390 (1939).
Basically, the warmness or coolness toward this suggestion turns on whether
one believes in a "specialized" court such as is the principal characteristic of
the Tax Court, or a court made up of judges who are not specialists in tax
law, but who presumably would have a broader knowledge of and experience
in general principles of law which often are the heart and core of the "tax"
problem before the court.
205 Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate
and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and Proposal, 38 COL. L. REv. 1393 (1938).
106 As expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S.
489 (1943).
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ternal "reviews" within the Internal Revenue Service itself, but of equal
importance, in helping to sustain in the public mind the image of fair-
ness and equity in the administration of the revenue laws.
B. Within the Administrative Agency Itself.
Conceding that when headed by dedicated and knowledgeable Com-
missioners, there is a sincere and continuous impetus for bettering the
quality and fairness of the administration of the revenue laws, there is
still room for substantial improvements.
Three specific areas for further exploration are suggested:
1. Improving Conference and Review Procedures in the Office of
the District Director.
Dissatisfaction persists with the efficacy of "conferences" and "re-
views" for settlement purposes, at the lower echelons, that is, in the
District Director's office. Though improved over previous procedures,
the present "informal conference" with the Revenue Agent's Group
Chief or other Conferees appointed by the "Conference Coordinator,"
still leaves much to be desired. Succinctly stated, the limitations to the
extensive use of this settlement technique may be listed as:
a) If the issue is one which is either currently being litigated by the
Commissioner or where an adverse position has been indicated by in-
ternal "directives" or published "non-acquiescence" with respect to
favorable court decisions, the Conferee would have no authority to make
any settlement contrary to this "internal" position.
b) Lack of authority of the Conferee to compromise on the basis of
a doubtful legal liability on the part of the taxpayer on a particular issue,
or on the basis of an appraisal of the strength of legal argument on a
given point, thus limiting the area for settlement negotiations principally
to "fact" issues.
c) Danger to the taxpayer that new issues will be raised by the
Government as the result of an unsuccessful informal conference, thus
adding to the taxpayer's "burden of proof" problem in the event of
litigation. 10 7
d) Finally, reluctance on the part of the Conferee at the informal
conference level to take the responsibility for the settlement of larger
and more complex cases. 08
IKnowledgeable observers have concluded that the informal confer-
ence procedure is advantageous mainly to the small taxpayer, since it
107 Taylor, in Tax Controversies: Some Administrative and Litigative Aspects,
1962 So. CALIF. TAx INST., p. 262, points out that:
"Although the policy of the Internal Revenue Service as announced in Rev.
Rul. 53-266 is not to raise new issues in defense or settlement negotiations
'unless the ground for such action is a substantial one and the potential effect
upon tax liability is material,' as a matter of practice, new issues are fre-
quently raised."
108 Taylor, Tax Controversies: Some Administrative and Litigative Aspects, op.
cit., fn. 107, supra.
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permits him to present his case orally and without the necessity of em-
ploying counsel; that the procedure also permits the quick and economi-
cal disposition of cases in which the Revenue Agent is clearly wrong on
the law; and that beyond this, however, the procedure is of doubtful
value.109
At the higher levels, namely, in the Appellate Division of the office
of the Regional Commissioner, the quality of review, both in the pre-90
day and post-90 day stages, generally is good; settlement authority is
broad and on the whole, is fairly, though "toughly," exercised.
2. Establishing Procedures for "Trials" by "Hearing -Officers" or
"Examiners" in Cases Involving Limited Amounts.
We must not forget that in pre-Board of Tax Appeals days, there
were procedures within the Internal Revenue Service itself for deter-
mining controversies between the "aggrieved" taxpayer and the Com-
missioner.110
The system proved to be inadequate for two main reasons: (a) after
an adverse decision, the taxpayer had no recourse but to pay the tax
and then sue for a refund; in other words, there was no court review
without prepayment of the proposed deficiency, and (b) the suspicion
that decisions by employees of the Internal Revenue Service itself
could not be "fair" to the taxpayer.
It is suggested that one of the most serious gaps in the entire pro-
cedural machinery within the Internal Revenue Service is the failure to
provide a quick and fair forum for the disposition of disputes before an
assessment is proposed, other than on the basis of a negotiated settle-
ment. The Tax Court dockets are replete with contested cases involving
small sums of money, usually relating to (a) travel and entertainment
expense items; (b) other "ordinary and necessary" business items; (c)
dependency exemptions; (d) depreciation issues, etc.
It would seem that taxpayers feeling "aggrieved," and unable to
settle these cases for a multiplicity of reasons within the framework of
the Internal Revenue Service settlement machinery, should not be com-
pelled to incur the expense and delays necessitated by a proceeding in
the Tax Court.
The lessons of other administrative agencies, both federal and state,
are clear. Hearings or trials by "hearing officers" or "examiners," as
they are variously called, with full power to decide issues of fact under
adequate "due-process" safeguards, with finality in effect except for
limited right to "review" or to "de novo" proceedings in courts of law,
109The Mills Sub-Committee Advisory Group, which had studied this problem,
concluded that "the informal conference procedure is apparently working sat-
isfactorily in the handling of smaller cases and less complex cases but, in the
view of the Advisory Group, it is of small value when applied to the larger or
more complex cases." (Mills Sub-Committee Report, p. 45).
110 9 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION, Sec. 50.02; 1 CAsEY, FEDERAL
TAX PRACTICE, Sec. 6.1.
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are well-established, and generally have been acknowledged as a neces-
sary feature in this age of multiplying administrative agencies.,"
There would seem to be no valid reasons why a similar machinery
cannot and should not be established within the framework of the In-
ternal Revenue Service.
By way of suggestion only, certainly subject to refinement and im-
provement, the outline of such a system could be:
a) Hearing officers, though employed by the Internal Revenue
Service, would be especially trained for the exercise of judicial func-
tions, would be engaged full-time in this work, would be well paid so
as to indicate a superior status in training and quality of the work ex-
pected, and should develop within a short span of time, if so directed,
attitudes of independence and detachment from the primary functions
of other personnel in the Internal Revenue Service, so as to guarantee
fairness in their decisions.1 12
b) One or more full-time hearing officers, depending on the volume
of litigation in that area, would be installed in the offices of each Dis-
trict Director.
c) Recruiting, training, and supervision of the activities of the hear-
ing officers would emanate from the National Office of one of the As-
sistant Commissioners, but through him would be de-centralized in the
office of one of the Assistant Regional Commissioners within which is
the jurisdiction of the particular District Director.
d) Jurisdiction will be vested in the hearing officer by written con-
sent on the part of the taxpayer at the pre-90 day letter stage.
e) Controversies would be limited to cases or issues where the pro-
posed deficiency assessment, excluding penalties and interest regardless
of what type of taxes are involved, does not exceed $1,000.00 per tax
year.
f) Decisions of the hearing officer would be final, would be recorded
in the form of a written "opinion," and if adverse to the taxpayer, to
that extent, assessment would immediately be made without opportunity
for further "conferences"- and "protests" within the Internal Revenue
Service.
It is believed that a system substantially as indicated: (a) would do
a great deal to eliminate resentment by many taxpayers at "unfair"
settlements or at "unfair" assessments made without reaching settle-
ments; and (b) taxpayers, not willing to avail themselves of this
"hearing" procedure, would in no way be prejudiced since they would
Kuckman, The Role of the Hearing Officer: A Private Practitioner's Point
of View, 44 CALI. L. REv. 212 (1956); Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem
-Symptom and Symbol, 40 CoN ELL. L. Q. 281 (1955); Rutledge, Administra-
tive Trial Examiners: The Anonymous "Masters;" 30 WAsH. L. REv. 26(1955).
112 See authorities op. cit., fn. 111, supra.
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retain their rights to Tax Court, District Court, or Court of Claims
review.
3. Decentralizing Action Where "Consent" of the Commissioner is
Required.
We have previously seen that an area of potential abuse exists where
the Commissioner's consent is required by the taxpayer in various sit-
uations such as: (a) change of accounting method; (b) change of bad
debt method; (c) change in method of depreciation, etc. As the law
now stands, there is no internal administrative review available to the
taxpayer in these situations, since the taxpayer's application for the
Commissioner's consent is initially made "at the top," that is, directly
to the "National Office" in Washington. Request for the Commissioner's
consent could be made directly to the local District Director in the same
manner as a request for a letter of determination. A review of the
Director's action could also be provided at the level of the Regional
Commissioner.
11 3
4. Stricter Inspection Service Needed to Eliminate the "Fixing"
Image.
Realizing that "pay-offs" and "fixing" are "dirty" words, candor
nevertheless compels some discussion on this distasteful subject.
Strict enforcement activities conducted by the Government, often
resulting in painful sanctions against the very small segment of "cheat-
ing" taxpayers, are justified, in spite of the fact that the great majority
of taxpayers do their best to be honest in their dealings with the In-
ternal Revenue Service. Otherwise, it is feared that the honest taxpayer
would become turgid in his enthusiasm for honesty, if he thought that
the dishonest taxpayer was not vigorously pursued and punished.
In the same frame of reference, as long as some taxpayers, no
matter how few, are able to insist, and in some cases even boastfully,
that they "did not get hurt" because they were able to "fix" or have
someone else "fix" a potentially dangerous or expensive situation, the
morale of the entire tax-gathering system is weakened. In some areas
of this country, "fixing" activities are rumored to be widespread and
even endemic. This is a cancer which, if it spreads, would eat away at
the entire self-assessment system. It is not a sufficient answer for re-
sponsible Government representatives to claim that it is impossible to
eradicate these malfeasors. An enlarged and improved Internal Security
Division within the Internal Revenue Service with the active assistance
of the Department of Justice should be able to eliminate these offenders,
113For example, Regs. 1.446-1(3) (change in method of accounting) and Regs.
1.442-1 (b) (change of accounting period) provide that in order to obtain the
consent of the Commissioner to the requested changes, the taxpayer must file
a petition in Washington, D.C.; nothing is said about pre-Washington proce-
dures or about reviews from the Commissioner's action after filing the petition
in Washington.
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particularly if severe punishment is meted out both to the "fixer" and
to the "fixee."1 14
V
CONCLUSION
1. If "abuse" of administrative "discretion" is properly defined, its
existence is not wide-spread.
2. There is room for additional statutory "relief" which would tend
to reduce situations where "abuses" may occur at the administrative
level.
3. The processes of review and interference by courts should be
unfettered from some of the present restraints.
4. There is room for improved procedures within the administrative
agency itself which would afford the "aggrieved" taxpayer speedy and
fair disposition of his controversy, and which in turn would in itself
constitute for him "relief" from what he would have considered an
"abuse" of administrative discretion.
114 "The IRS has initiated a new campaign aimed at weeding out and prosecuting
those taxpayers, and a few unscrupulous practitioners, who offer bribes to
Service personnel in return for favorable tax treatment. The Service has rec-
ognized that such conduct threatens to undermine the entire tax structure and
it is determined to stamp it out at its roots. Commissioner Caplin has urged
Agents to report all bribery offers. The campaign has already brought ex-
cellent results. Over 60 suspected bribery offers were reported in the twelve
month period ended August 31, 1962. This compares with the 14 reported
bribe offers for an entire two-and-one-half year period ending in 1960. Con-
victions have already been obtained in several of the newly reported cases. The
Treasury is considering asking for legislation to eradicate another pernicious
practice with which the Department has been unable to cope. This is the
practice, by some preparers of tax returns, of falsely representing to a client
that they require a sum of money to 'bribe' an Agent, and then pocketing the
money themselves." 17 J. Taxation 384 (1962).
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